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George Washington and George Washington's slaves lived different reali-
ties. And if we extend that insight to all the dimensions of [White
American history we will realize that [B]lacks lived at a different time
and a different reality in this country. And the terrifying implication of
all this is that there is another time, another reality, another America.'
INTRODUCTION
On the day after tax day, 1996, I read with fascination an article in the
San Francisco Chronicle titled "State Panel Probes Legislator's Reluctance to
Pay Federal Taxes." 2 The article reported that state senator Don Rogers, a
Bakersfield Republican, was under investigation for his declaration four
years ago that he did not have to pay federal taxes. The reason: Rogers
claimed he held a "[W]hite man's citizenship" and was not a United States
citizen. The article quoted from the affidavit Rogers had filed with the So-
noma County recorder's office in 1992-the same year, the article noted,
that he had filed for protection under the federal bankruptcy law after the
Internal Revenue Service sought nearly $150,000 in back taxes, interest,
and penalties:
I, Donald A. Rogers, being of sound mind and lawful age, do
solemnly declare: I was born in Louisiana State of parents who
were [Wihite, who were Citizen-Principals and whose parents
time out of mind were and always had been W hite....
[The "main purpose" of Clause One of the Fourteenth
Amendment is establishing "the citizenship of the Negro."] And
because such a [Wihite man's citizenship was not restricted by
the 14th Amendment and because he receives no protection
from it, he has no reciprocal obligation to a 14th Amendment
allegiance or sovereignty and owes no obedience to anyone un-
der the 14th Amendment.3
Surfing the World Wide Web after reading this article, I found five dif-
ferent websites in one afternoon concerning the illegality of the tax system,
1. LERONE BENNETT, THE CHAILLENGE oF BLACKNEss 39 (1972).
2. Robert G. Gunnison, State Panel Probes Legislator's Reluctance to Pay Federal Taxes,
S.F. CHRON.,Apr. 16, 1996, at A17.
3. Id.
In response to reporters' discovery of this document, Senator Rogers "denied that
he is a racist or that he believes he is not a fill-fledged United States citizen. He said he
has settled with the IRS and paid all his federal taxes." Id. "I got some bad advice, and
since then I changed my mind" the CHRONICLE reported Rogers said. "It was back at a
time when I was going through a problem with the IRS, and I looked at this and thought
it was maybe something that had some merit. But since then, I have decided it does not."
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each linking to four or five other sites, and most containing links to an e-
mail listserv for discussions. Nearly a decade later, although websites have
moved in and out of existence and in and out of public accessibility, a simi-
lar search turned up similar results. Although many of these sites offer
materials for sale, many more do not. Interspersed with the ads for books
and videotapes promising immediate relief from taxes are many, many arti-
cles and essays written by non-lawyers on constitutional matters and posted
for discussion. Multiple copies of the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution are linked to these web pages. Even the material on these sites
that seems primarily aimed at taking advantage of people's greed and gulli-
bility taps into a conversation that transcends narrow economic interests.
The conversation concerns the nature of American government and its
relationship to the people whom it purports to represent.
The people who create these sites are known by many names: Patri-
ots, citizens' militias, tax and antigovernment protesters, White separatists,
survivalists. They-especially immediately after the 1995 bombing of the
federal building in Oklahoma City-are often portrayed as more numerous,
better organized, and more powerful and menacing than they really are.4
They are also commonly described in the popular press in terms of their
distance from America: their political alienation, their ideological extrem-
ism, their social disaffection.
A subset of this broad, diverse, and fluid group, however, is notable not
only for its distance from America but also for its deep engagement with it.
These people, whom I will call "legal populists" understand themselves not
as opposed to the nation but as its disinherited scions. The troubles they
look forward to include the collapse of the United States government.Yet
4, Popular accounts seem both to exaggerate the threat these groups pose and to
caricature their members. Richard Mitchell, for example, emphasizes low turnouts and
poor organization among the survivalists he visited and got to know in the course of re-
searching his book, DANCING AT ARMAGEDDON, and he harshly criticizes journalists and
fellow academics for "sav[ing] the aryan cause and its like from its own triviality" by creat-
ing a mediagenic but false story of well-oiled machineries of violent racist terror. See
RICHARD MITCHELL, DANCING AT ARMAGEDDON: SuRvrvALIsM AND CHAOS IN MODERN
TIMES 173-74 (2002) (describing the media and academic fascination with "aryanism" and
concluding: "There is nothing grand about practiced aryanism including nothing grandly
sinister."). Betty Dobratz and Stephanie Shanks-Meile, who studied White separatists, note
the many factions these groups are split into and wonder whether they ought even to be
considered a single "movement." BrTY A. DOBRATZ & STEPHANIE SHANKS-MEILE, THE WHI
SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: "WHITE POWER, WHITE PRIDE!" 13 (1997).
They also quote George Eric Hawthorne of the Resistance Record Company (a White
power label) as musing, "I always find it-I'm trying to look for the right word-perhaps
perplexing that a movement that is really so relatively small--so relatively insignificant in
comparison to the power structure-can get so much media attention." Id. at 86. Kathleen
Blee observes that news media typically depict racist activists as "semniarticulate, lower-class
men (and sometimes women) who spew venomous sentiments about African Americans,
Jews and immigrants" but notes that actual recruitment patterns do not fit these stereotypes.
KATHLEEN M. BLEE, INSIDE ORGANIZED RACISM:WOMEN IN THE HATE MovMrrNr 25 (2002).
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they take the United States' basic legal documents-the Declaration of In-
dependence and the original Constitution-as sacred texts on par with the
Christian Bible, which many also revere. The people in whom I am inter-
ested are in fact conducting a romance with the law: its forms, its tools, its
expressive and material power. Legal populists are not likely to identify with
traditionally subordinated identity groups, but they do view themselves as
disenfranchised. And, as traditionally subordinated groups have often done
in the United States, they look to the law both as a site of oppression and as
a potential source of redemption.
This Article has three interrelated aims. First, I will briefly describe
the online world of the legal populists. Other legal scholars have provided
detailed and insightftil, even brilliant, glimpses of the legal worlds these
groups inhabit.5 However, like the popular press, they have tended to em-
phasize the distance of those worlds from "ours." The adjectives applied to
legal populists and their activities by these scholars do this work vividly:
"terrifying," "madness," "frivolous," "inane., 6 For me, however, the most
interesting thing about the legal populists is not their distance from the legal
and political mainstream but the intricate ways they-like the subordinated
identity groups with whom I identify, who are both their antitheses and
their cousins in struggle--at once reject and embrace it.
My second aim in this Article is to give an account of legal populism
that connects it with the American tradition of conspiracy theory and with
the political consciousness of survivalism. To the extent that the interpretive
practices of legal populists approach the vertiginous interpretive practices of
conspiracy theory, legal populism, as Mark Fenster writes of conspiracy the-
ory, "represents the desire for, and the possibility of, a knowable political
order; yet, in its disturbing revelations and uncertain resolution it also im-
plicildy recognizes the difficulty of achieving transparent, equitable power
relations in a capitalist democracy' 7 Moreover, law, I will suggest, is attrac-
tive to legal populists because learning to research and interpret Supreme
Court opinions and file liens, like building your own bomb shelter or
learning to live "off the grid," offers the possibility of a mastery over the
conditions of one's life that is rarely possible in contemporary mass society.
My third and final aim in this Article is to examine, as David
Williams has done in a wonderful series of articles,' the relationship be-
5. See, e.g., Susan P Koniak, When Law Risks Madness, 8 CARDOZO STun. L. & LrlERA-
TuiE 65 (1996); David C. WiLliams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YAuE L.J. 551 (1991) [hereinafterWillianis, Civic Republicanism].
6. See, e.g., Christopher S. Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering
Unto Caesar--Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. Rssv. 291 (1996-97); Koniak, supra note 5;
Williams, Civic Republicanism, supra note 5.
7. MARK FENSTER, CONSPIRACY THEORIES: SECRECY AND POWER IN AMERiCAN CUL-
aaR 138 (1999).
8. See Williams, Civic Republicanism, supra note 5; David C. Williams, Constitutional
Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74
[VOL. 10:269
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tween the nation dreamed of by many legal populists and the one inhabited
by state-sanctioned legal insiders. As Williams has convincingly shown,
many legal populists seek the restoration of a White republican America
that is utterly incompatible with the multinational, multicultural America of
the twenty-first century.9 Legal populism's nostalgia resonates with the
hopes of many elites, whose "conservative" political agenda similarly targets
both the federal government and unassimilable minorities as enemies of the
nation.Yet unlike these elites, the legal populists feel themselves to be disen-
franchised and disempowered, and their narratives reject rather than
embrace current distributions of political power. Legal populists occupy a
peculiar position in the nation that I think of as "marginalized but not sub-
ordinated.""' They desire the destruction of most existing legal, political, and
social regimes of power, but they do so in the name of a utopian vision that
is utterly true to aspects of American history that most Americans would
rather simply forget. A look at the legal populists' world, then, shows not
only its distance from but also its nearness to "our" own.
I. LEGAL POPULISM DESCRIBED
Akhil Amar, a legal scholar and student of the United States Constitu-
tion, notes that "[t]he idea of popular education resurfaces over and over in
the Bill of Rights."" We are familiar, he says, with the checks and balances
that form the structure of the original Constitution. National power was to
be checked and balanced by state power; judicial, executive, and legislative
power were to be separated and put in competition with one another. But
we tend to neglect the framers' assumption that the government itself was
to be checked by the People.'2 Amar argues that each intermediate associa-
tion the Bill of Rights safeguards-the church, the militia, and the jury:
TUL. L. REv. 387 (1999) [hereinafter Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence]; David C. Wil-
liams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81
CORNELL L. R.. 879 (1996) [hereinafterWilliams, The Militia Movement].
9. Williams, Civic Republicanism, supra note 5; Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence,
supra note 8;Willianms, The Militia Movement, supra note 8.
10. I thank Marc Spindelman for this formulation.
11. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1210
(1991) [hereinafter Amar, Bill of Rights].
12. For example, Amar notes that James Madison and Thomas Jefferson believed that
professional judges had to be counterbalanced by citizen juries. Id. at 1207. In addition,"both
Madison and Jefferson emphasized public education [about constitutional rights] as the rem-
edy for, and deterrent to, unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 1208. Patrick Henry and John
Marshall, in the Virginia ratifying convention, stressed the importance of"maxims" that ordi-
nary people in a democracy would know and use to regulate their conduct. Id. at 1208-09.
Amar quotes from the anti-federalist papers:
If a nation means its systems, religious or political, shall have duration, it ought
to recognize the leading principles of them in the front page of every family
book. What is the usefulness of a truth in theory, unless it exists constantly in
the minds of the people and has their assent.... [Elducation [consists of] a
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was understood as a device for educating ordinary citizens about
their rights and duties. The erosion of these institutions over the
last 200 years has created a vacuum at the center of our Consti-
tution. Thus, one of the main tasks for today's constitutional
theorists should be to explore ways this vacuum might be
filled. 3
Amar's vacuum is being filled, but not by professional constitutional
theorists communicating with readers from the general public. Rather, it is
being filled by "legal populism": everyday people reading and interpreting
the Constitution and federal cases and examining the basic elements of
constitutional structure for themselves. For the purpose of this Article, legal
populism encompasses the following features: (1) a patriotic interest in and
affiliation with the primary legal texts of the United States, including the
English common law, the Declaration of Independence, and/or the original
Constitution and Bill of Rights; (2) a deep suspicion, bordering on hatred,
of the current United States government, which is often allied with a fear
of an internationalist New World Order; (3) an engagement, bordering on
romance, with the techniques of law: legal argument, legal research, and
legal interpretation; and (4) participation in a dialogue with others about
these shared interests and commitments. 4 Although much legal populist
discourse takes place offline in workshops and seminars and through books
available for purchase, I have focused on free documents available online.
In real space, legal populism emerges from several distinct regions of
the United States. Whereas many of the for-profit seminars on tax avoid-
ance are centered in the Midwest, for instance, the far West is the
geographic ground zero of constitutional study by lay persons. (Indeed, an
series of notions impressed upon the minds of the people by examples, precepts
and declarations.
Id. at 1208 n.341 (citing 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 382-84 (Herbert Storing &
Murria Dry eds., 1981)).
13. Id. at 1210; see also AKHIL REED AmAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FoR THE PEOPLE: WHAT
TE CONSTIrrUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUTYOUR RIGHTS (1998).
14. I would therefore not include within "legal populism" those whose appeals to
the legal system seem prompted more by mental illness than political protest. Some con-
spiracy theorists seem to be engaged in a solitary effort to battle internal, personal demons
rather than collective culture. For example, in Tyler v. Carter, 151 ER.D. 537 (S.D.N.Y
1993), aff'd, 41 F3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994), a federal district court dismissed the claim of one
Teri Smith Tyler, who had sued former President Jimmy Carter, then-President William
Clinton, Ross Perot,American Cyanamid, Iron Mountain Security Corporation, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, IBM, "David Rockerfeller [sic], Rockerfeller [sic] Fund," BCCI, and
NASA. Id. at 537. Ms.Tyler, representing herself, filed a federal complaint in December, 1992,
alleging what the court called "a bizarre conspiracy involving the defendants to enslave and
oppress certain segments of our society" Id. Tyler's understanding of this conspiracy, however,
was internally generated: "Plaintiff contends she is a cyborg, and that she received most of the
information which forms the basis for her complaint, through 'proteus" which [the Court]
read to be some silent, telepathic form of communication." Id.
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article published in 1995 in the journal Government Executive declared con-
stitutional interpretation "the newest hobby in the rural West.")'" In
cyberspace, however, legal populism forms a single, many-layered "subaltern
counterpublic"-a public world within a world, distinct both from the
formal world of state politics and from the civic life of the general public."
Legal populism is closely connected with what its participants sometimes
call the "Patriot" movement. One writer describes the Patriot movement
this way:
The Patriot movement is an American political ideology based
on an ultranationalistic and selective populism which seeks to
return the nation to its "constitutional" roots-that is, a system
based on White Christian male rule. Its core myth is that such a
reactionary revolution will bring about a great national rebirth,
ending years of encroaching moral and political decadence
wrought by a gigantic world conspiracy of probably Satanic ori-
gins. 17
Central to the Patriot movement is a deep engagement and familiar-
ity with legal texts.18 Indeed, Amar's work suggests that the legal populists
would have been smiled on by the Founding Fathers. They are carrying
on the tradition of a citizenry that is not passive but instead actively edu-
cated in its rights, a citizenry that takes the Constitution and
constitutional questions very seriously, as a matter of day-to-day life and
not just as something one learns in school. 9 At a legal and philosophical
15. Robert E. Taylor, Vitriol and Violence, GOV'T ExEcUTivE (July 1995).
16. See NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL .EFLECTIONS ON THE "PosT-
SOCIALIST" CONDITION 81 (1997); see also Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting Power: The
Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 58
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). As Jane Mansbridge writes:
The goals of these counterpublics include understanding themselves better,
forging bonds of solidarity, preserving the memories of past injustices, inter-
preting and reinterpreting the meanings of those injustices, working out
alternative conceptions of self, of community, of justice, and of universality,
trying to make sense of both the privileges they wield and the oppressions
they face, understanding the strategic configurations for and against their de-
sired ends, deciding what alliances to make both emotionally and
strategically, deliberating on ends and means, and deciding how to act, indi-
vidually and collectively.
Id. at 58.
17. DAVID A. NEIWERT, IN GOD'S COUNTRY: THE PATRIOT MOVEMENT AND THE
PACIFIc NORTwEsT 4 (1999).
18. Id. at 3 (noting that the Patriot movement intends to politically transform the
United States "through the creation of its own alternative legal, political and economic
system, which it promotes largely through so-called 'common-law' schemes").
19. Consider, as an example, the online "Dixieland Law Journal," maintained by a
Huntsville, Alabama attorney named Lowell H. "Larry" Becraft, Jr. Introduction, The
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level, moreover, they carry on the debates that emerged around the draft-
ing and ratification of the Constitution and the subsequent debates that
emerged around the time of the first Reconstruction. Indeed, because
these debates have never been settled even within the mainstream of
jurisprudential thought, these groups are engaged in an ongoing conver-
sation in American society about a matter that everyone in the
conversation agrees to be important, even fundamental: how shall "We the
People" constitute ourselves?
Ironically, however, the very seriousness with which these groups
engage in the debate also makes them a threat to the existing social order,
particularly the federal government-an institution which these groups
treat as more or less illegitimate. In Patriot circles, the federal government
is often referred to as "ZOG' which stands for Zionist Occupied (or
Occupation) Government; 20 and the federal government-including but
not limited to the IRS-has a similar level of respect for them. The places
where the legal populists come into contact with the mainstream legal
system, then, rather than being places where edifying debates shape for-
merly passive nonvoters into thoughtful and caring civic republicans, are
places fraught with tension, if not open conflict.1
Dixieland Law Journal, at http://home.hiwaay.net/-becraft/INTRO.htnl (last visited
Mar. 29, 2005). Becraft describes himself as "nothing but a country hillbilly lawyer... who
find[s] the company of'bubbas' more enjoyable and preferable than that of socialites." Id.
He describes his journal's mission thus:
During and after the Revolutionary War, European scholars noted that
Americans were not only highly literate, but very knowledgeable about the
"law" as well. Part of the reason for the legal literacy of those Americans is
attributable to that magnificent work, Sir William Blackstone's Comimentar-
ies on the Laws of England, which was a best seller in the colonies. But the
circumstances of Americans have changed over the last 200 years and today
too many lack a working knowledge of the "law," and especially of "freedom
law."... The purpose of this site is to assist those who seek legal tools for the
battle to restore liberty and freedom to this country.
Id.
20. See Colin Flint, United States Hegemony and the Construction of Racial Hatreds, in
SPACES OF HATE: GEOGRAPHIES OF DISCRIMINATION AND INTOLERANCE IN THE U.S.A. 165,
172 (Colin Flint ed., 2003) ("[Tlhe far right claims the government is the illegitimate
Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG), a conspiratorial Jewish and leftist authority that
operates against [W]hite Americans.").The term is featured in William Pierce's 1978 novel,
THE TURNER DIARIES, a book that has greatly influenced various groups involved in legal
populism. See JAMES CORCORAN, BITTER HARVEST: GORDON KAHL AND THE POSSE COMI-
TATUS: MURDER IN THE HEARTLAN, 37 (1990). For a further discussion of THE TURNER
DiAIES, see infra text accompanying note 162.
21. Given this conflict, mainstream republican academics and practicing republicans
tend to avoid each other. See, e.g., AMA & HIRSCH, supra note 13 (disclaiming any alliance
with present-day militia groups). One legal scholar, conversely, has accused Amar of being
a "'thinking man's Freeman,' a person who waives [sic] the Constitution, the Federalist
Papers, and other founding era texts in our faces in an effort to promote unfounded and
[VOL. 10:269
Vultures in Eagles' Clothing
Legal populism can be divided into at least four overlapping conver-
sations about the law and its institutions. The first conversation is
associated with money in general and taxes in particular and concerns the
legitimacy of the federal income tax, economic institutions such as the
Federal Reserve Bank, and various international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund. The second conversation is associated with
the militia movement specifically and "gun culture" more generally and
concerns the meaning of the Second Amendment, the structure and func-
tion of state and local militias, and the legitimacy of the federal
government. The third conversation is associated with efforts (often illegal
or extra-legal) to reconstitute or invent new legal sovereignties, often
through defying or "jamming" existing legal institutions and actors. The
fourth conversation is associated with the "Freemen" or "Sovereign Citi-
zen" movement and concerns the effort to redeem national citizenship.
People may enter these unofficial legal conversations through one or
more of these interests and for various reasons: greed and the desire to make
money, gullibility, and/or straitened economic circumstances; a radical disil-
lusionment with the political economy of the United States and the world
more generally; a coniitment to White race pride and separatism; the
desire to deeply engage with the legal documents that formed the United
States; libertarian political views; the conviction that governments and cor-
porations have too much money and power; or a desire to live in a world
where political economy is actively being made, not passively received. In
this Article, my aim is not to provide a complete account of these world-
views but only to highlight some of the complex ways legal populism
simultaneously rejects and embraces official state law. The following sections
provide a brief glimpse into the four worlds of legal populism just
described.
A. Taxes and Money
The affidavit Senator Rogers filed emerges from the convergence of
at least two long, rich traditions in American life: tax protest and huck-
sterism.2' The American addiction to get-rich schemes, including tax
evasion schemes, needs no introduction. It is not surprising that people
hoping to get rich themselves have used various legalistic arguments in
books, tapes, and workshops to help people persuade the IRS that they do
not actually have to pay taxes. Nor is it surprising that this industry is now
accessible through the Internet. Type the word "taxes" into any Internet
sometimes bizarre ideas based on a background reading of the American historical narrative."
Brett W King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, Supermajority
Rules, 2 U. PA.J. CoNsi. L. 609,612 (2000).
22. See ROBERT J. HAws, A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO TAXATION IN
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 115 (Phillip Sawicki ed., 1983).
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search engine and you will quickly tap into a series of sites that promise, if
you simply give them your credit card number, that you can buy books or
pamphlets or audiotapes with titles like "IRS Under Indictment" and
"Vultures in Eagle's [sic] Clothing." These materials explain how the In-
ternal Revenue Service actually has no claim on you. Freedom from
federal tax liability is only a few hundred dollars away.
Reliable estimates of the actual number of tax protesters and the
amount the federal government loses annually to tax evasion and fraud are
hard to find.23 Anecdotal evidence of a thriving industry in tax scamming,
however, is not so hard to find. As one example, the urban legend that the
IRS permits African Americans to claim a "reparations credit" has circu-
lated in various iterations for years, finding particularly fertile ground in
Black churches in the South and West.24 In January 2002 the IRS an-
nounced it had received nearly 80,000 returns for the previous tax year
claiming more than $2.7 billion in false reparations refunds, and it filed
civil suits in United States federal district courts in Richmond, Virginia,
and Jackson, Mississippi, against two tax preparers spreading this gospel.
2
1
In the fall of the previous year, Florida law enforcement officials put a
Miami-Dade mother and daughter team that had been promoting a simi-
lar scam out of business.26
Within the world of tax protest, a number of arguments, although
repeatedly rejected by the courts, have become canonical in legal populist
communities. A few of them follow:
23. Estimates like $200 billion to $300 billion per year in lost federal revenue are
sometimes thrown around. See, e.g., Taxpayer Beware: Schemes, Scams, and Cons: Hearing Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong., 2-4 (2001) (conments of Sen. Max Baucus
(D-MT) and Sen. Frank Murkowski (R-AK)). A more conservative estimate puts the "tax
gap"-the difference between the amount of tax owed to the government and the
amount actually paid-at something over $127 billion annually. Pamela H. Bucy, Criminal
Tax Fraud: The Downfall of Murderers, Madams, and Thieves, 29 Amz. ST. L.J. 639, 639 (1997).
24. See Laura Vozzela, Man Faces Prison for Tipping Others to 'Black Tax Credit,' CoM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.),June 20, 1999, at A10.
25. Jerry Seperjustice Sues Tax Preparers over Slavery Refund Quest, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2002, at B2.
26. Susan R. Miller, Tax Scam Shut Down; South Florida Mother-Daughter Team Told
African American Clients They'd Get Tax Credits as Reparation for Slavery, BROWARD DAILY Bus.
REv., Oct. 3,2001, at A9; see also IRS Fact Sheet, Reparation Scams Carry a Price, Release No.
FS-2002-08 (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fi-02-08.pdf (report-
ing five criminal cases resulting in convictions of"[B]lack tax" credit promoters).
These reparations scams are not necessarily directly related to tax fraud. A flyer adver-
tising $5000 "reparations checks"--sent to people of "Black ethnic race" born prior to
1928-encouraged elderly African Americans to supply their names, addresses, phone
numbers, Social Security numbers, and dates of birth to an organization with a Washing-
ton, D.C. post office box. Misleading Mailings Targeted to Seniors: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of
Darrin Williams, Chief of Staff and Counsel, Office of the Arkansas Atty. Gen.). Federal
investigators tracking the organization down found no evidence of identity fraud but did
discover a database compiled for the purpose of further mailings. Id.
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1. Federal Reserve Notes Are Not Legal Tender
Because the United States monetary system is no longer secured to
the gold standard, this argument posits that federal reserve notes do not
constitute actual money in themselves but instead are mere "promises to
pay." One version of this claim is based on the ParValue Modification Act,
Section 2,7 which established a new par value of the dollar in terms of
gold such that forty-two and two-ninths dollars would equal one fine troy
ounce of gold. Citing to this statute, one federal defendant claimed that,
for tax purposes, his income should be calculated in terms of the market
price of gold.2' Another, more sweeping argument is that federal reserve
notes, because they are not backed by gold, are not lawful tender within
the meaning of Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution,' 9 which
gives Congress the power "to coin Money, regulate the value thereof, and
of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures."30 This
argument is closely related to the argument that Article I, 5 10, clause 1-
"No State shall ... coin Money; Emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts"3 -"prohibits the
States from utilizing any paper note or credit issued by any private bank-
ing institution, whether the same be Federal Reserve Notes, bookkeeping
entries of liability or otherwise."
'3 2
2.Wages Are Not Income
The argument that wages are not income was widely circulated in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, encouraged by popular books such as Are
You Required? by Bob Golden and Pete Soehnlen and Judicial Tyranny by
Jeff Dickstein. 3 The classic form of the argument draws on a Supreme
Court decision that defined income as "the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined.' 34 If income means profit, then wages are
(arguably) not income because the exchange of labor for compensation is
27. 31 U.S.C. 5 449.
28. Birkenstock v. C.I.R., 646 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 628 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Ware, 608 U.S. 400 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Schiff, 612 F2d 73 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v.Wangrud, 533 F2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976).
30. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
31. Id. at§ lO, cl. 1.
32. Larry Becraft, Memorandum of Law: The Money Issue, The Dixieland Law Journal,
at http://home.hiwaay.net/-becraft/ (last updated Sept. 1, 1999).
33. See Larry Becraft, Sovereignty: On Patriot Mythology, at http://www.cascadian.com/
CRC/Court/OnPatriotMythology.html (last visited Mar. 4,2000).
34. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,207 (1920).
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an "even exchange" and thus creates no profit." A variant of the argument
is that wages are not income because they are derived from the taxpayer's
36person, which is a depreciable asset.
3. The Sixteenth Amendment Was Never Properly Ratified
A host of challenges are regularly asserted against the propriety of
the Sixteenth Amendment, which was ratified in 1913 and gave Congress
the authority to impose income taxes without regard to apportionment.
To prove that the Sixteenth Amendment was never in fact ratified, it must
be shown that at least three states' ratifications were improper and void.3
In their efforts to do this, protesters have called attention to the existence
of numerous procedural and clerical errors in the ratification process in
several states. 9 The ratification process in Oklahoma was particularly rid-
dled with mistakes and lapses in procedural regularity, and so the
argument that Oklahoma's ratification was improper is a favorite of pro-
40testers.
35. United States v. Davenport, 824 E2d 1511, 1520 (7th Cir. 1987); Lonsdale v.
C.I.R., 661 F2d 71,72 (5th Cit. 1981).
36. See Coleman v. C.I.R., 791 F2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1986).
37. Prior to 1913, federal tax revenues were derived fiom miscellaneous taxes im-
posed on a case-by-case basis. A tax imposed to pay for the Civil War expired under its
own terms in 1872. Jackson, supra note 6, at 291.A second income tax imposed in 1894
was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision because it violated the
Apportionment Clause. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on reh'g,
158 U.S. 601 (1895). According to one commentator, "the 1894 income tax represented a
victory for citizens in the economically depressed South and West, who had asserted with
increasing intensity that the corporate barons of the East should be compelled to 'share the
wealth' resulting from the booming industrial economy."Jackson, supra note 6, at 299 n.59
(citing DAvID BURNHAM, A LAw UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE I.R.S. 14 (1989)).
38. Jackson, supra note 6, at 305.
39. Id. at 302.
40. Id. at 305. Tax protesters have also argued that Ohio was not a state admitted
into the Union until 1953 and thus President William H.Taft of Ohio was not legally the
president of the United States in 1913, making his appointment of Secretary of State Phi-
lander C. Knox, who verified that the Sixteenth Amendment was properly ratified, null
and void. Id. Other arguments "contend that Secretary of State Knox committed fraud
when he certified the amendment as ratified because he was aware of the differences be-
tween the congressional and state versions of the proposed Sixteenth Amendment" and
"assert that the Secretary of State's certification of the Sixteenth Amendment was an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative authority and a violation of the constitutional
separation of powers." Id. at 306.
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4.The Tax System Is Unlawful Because It Violates
Individual Constitutional kights
Many different provisions of the Constitution have unsuccessfully
been invoked to support the conclusion that the tax system is unlawful
because it violates individual constitutional rights. For example, filing tax
returns is said to be proscribed by the Fifth Amendment as a form of self-
incrimination, 41 or to violate the constitutional right to privacy encom-
passed by the Ninth Amendment. Income taxes are said to constitute a
taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment,42 and the obligation to pay taxes is said to be a form of in-
voluntary servitude unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment?
3
5. Paying Income Taxes is Voluntary
Finally, it is often said in the tax protest literature that the income
tax is "voluntary" and therefore optional,4 as there is no statute that
makes any American citizen liable to pay the income tax. The IRS re-
sponse is that "voluntariness" refers to the fact that you are responsible for
41. See United States v. Buckner, 830 F2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Malquist, 791 E2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); Stubbs v. Comm'r, 797 E2d 936, 938 (11th
Cit. 1986).
42. See Schiffv. United States, 919 E2d 830,832 (2nd Cit. 1990).
43. See Lonsdale v. Egger, 525 F Supp. 610, 612 (N.D. Tex. 1981); United States v.
Roberts, 425 F. Supp. 1281, 1282 (D. Del. 1977); Beltran v. Cohen, 303 F. Supp. 889, 891
(N.D. Cal. 1969).
44. See Lonsdale v. United States, 919 E2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cit. 1990);Wilcox v.
Comm'r, 848 E2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cit. 1988); United States v.Witvoet, 767 F.2d 338, 339
(7th Cit. 1985).
45. Thus, the online "Freedom Law School" promises a cash reward to anyone who
can prove, among other things, that such a statute exists. $300,000 Income Tax Reward Offer,
Freedom Law School, at http://www.livefreenow.org/freedomopportunity/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2005). The Freedom Law School's reward offer is as follows:
Freedom Law School will offer $100,000 to the first person, who can dem-
onstrate any of the below propositions. The winner can collect up to
$300,000 if he/she can demonstrate all of the 3 propositions listed below:
[1] Show what statute written by the Congress of the United States requires
me to file an Income Tax Confession (Return) and pay an Income Tax. [2]
How can I file an Income Tax Confession (Return) without waiving my 5th
Amendment protected right to not give any information to the government
that may be used to prosecute me? [3] Prove that the 16th Amendment of
the United States Constitution, the Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
which, according to the IRS and modern American courts permitted the In-
come Tax to exist, was lawfully added to the U.S. Constitution.
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assessing your own tax liability and is not the same as having the option
46not to pay taxes.
Each of these arguments appears repeatedly in the tax protest litera-
ture, sometimes dying down for a few years only to flourish again when a
new purveyor of tax avoidance services discovers it. Each of these argu-
ments has also appeared repeatedly, and been repudiated, in the courts.
Courtrooms represent one front line where tax protesters and their vision
of an alternative legal universe meet the official legal universe, and the
results have not been happy. From a mainstream judicial perspective, tax
protesters are threatening because of the trouble their behavior creates for
the judicial bureaucracy; because their arguments are not just wrong but
deeply, complexly wrong, requiring time and energy to refute; because
they refuse the authority of the judicial system, re-trying arguments that
have long since been rejected, filing papers that violate conventions of
argumentation and citation, and seeking remedies that cannot be granted;
because their arguments are grounded in political convictions that have
long since been consigned to the dustbin of history or that are repugnant
to most upper-middle class liberal professionals; because their interpretive
logic follows the rules of conspiracy theorizing; and perhaps because their
thoroughgoing skepticism reveals to a discomfiting degree the conven-
tional roots of legal institutions and legal practices.
Emblematic of these protesters might be Eugene M. and Patsy
Lonsdale, who throughout the 1980s tirelessly pressed their claims about
the invalidity of the tax system in both the Fifth and the Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals. In Lonsdale v. United States,47 for example, the Lonsdales
filed what they described as a "quiet title" action against the federal gov-
ernment, seeking to prevent Internal Revenue Service levies for unpaid
income taxes on their wages and on a credit union account.46 Upholding
the district court's decision that their request was barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act, the Tenth Circuit recounted:
The bulk of the Lonsdales' suit constitutes a refrain about the
federal government's power to tax wages or to tax individuals at
all, which the Lonsdales have been pursuing for at least fourteen
years. 9 After exercising considerable patience and tolerance, the
46. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, Wy Do I Have to Pay Taxes?,
available at www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/O,,id=119100,00.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 1,2005) [hereinafter Why Do I Have to Pay Taxes?].
47. 919 F2d at 1440.
48. Id. at 1441-42.
49. See Lonsdale v. Smelser, 709 F2d 910 (5th Cir. 1983); Lonsdale v. C.I.R., 661
E2d 71 (5th Cir.), aff'g, Lonsdale v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1106 (1981); Lonsdale v.
Smelser, 553 F Supp. 259 (N.D.Tex. 1982); Lonsdale v. Egger, 525 F Supp. 610 (N.D.Tex.
1981).The Tenth Circuit provided a sample of the Lonsdales' legal argumentation:
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Fifth Circuit finally imposed money sanctions totaling
$1,445.55 on the Lonsdales for their repeated attempt to reliti-
gate issues already adjudicated by the courts.'s
As in the case of the Lonsdales, tax protesters attract the ire not only
of the Internal Revenue Service, which rejects their substantive argu-
ments, but of the court system itself, which finds tax protesters a drain on
precious judicial resources of time and energy. Thus judges fight back
with court-imposed sanctions for frivolous filings and appeals. The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals, because it includes a region of the
country-Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin-in which the tax protest
movement has traditionally been exceptionally active, has fought a low-
level campaign against tax protesters for years. For example, in United
States v. Buckner, the trial court granted the prosecutor's request for an or-
der forbidding the defense to bring:
to the attention of the jury by argument or evidence any mat-
ters relating to five enumerated issues: That the Sixteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was improperly ratified
and therefore never came into being; That wages are not in-
come and therefore are not subject to federal income tax laws;
The Defendant United States through its Internal Revenue Service employ-
ees erroneously illegally unlawfully and unConstitutionally made an
Amendment 4 seizure of the Plaintiff(s) PROPERTY PERSONAL AND
REAL in the form of their LABOR PROPERTY/LABOR SERVICES
PROPERTY and theirWAGE COMPENSATION PAYCHECK MONEY
INCOME SPECIALIZED TYPE OF PROPERTY they receive directly from
their OCCUPATION OF COMMON RIGHT by their LABOR
PROPERTY and/or LABOR SERVICES PROPERTY the United States tax
laws at the Federal Code of Tax Regulations at 26 C.ER. 301.6331-1 and
TITLE 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6331 since they have no lawful color of Constitutional
taxing and tax collecting authority and jurisdiction to apply any Article 1, Sec.
8 INDIRECT EXCISE TAXES upon the Plaintiffi OCCUPATION OF
COMMON RIGHT, their LABOR PROPERTY, their LABOR SERVICES
PROPERTY, and their WAGE COMPENSATION PAYCHECK MONEY
INCOME SPECIALIZED TYPE OF PROPERTY WITHOUT
APPORTIONMENT., or with any 16th Amendment INDIRECT EXCISE
INCOME TAX upon the Plaintiff(s) OCCUPATION OF COMMON
RIGHT, their LABOR PROPERTY, their LABOR SERVICES
PROPERTY, or their WAGE COMPENSATION PAYCHECK MONEY
INCOME SPECIALIZED TYPE OF PROPERTY WITHOUT
APPORTIONMENT, or with any 1939 PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SALARY
TAX ACT "WITHHOLDING" DIRECT TAX which pertains strictly to
federal government officers, employees, and elected officials., and; which is
absolutely unConstitutional as shown by SECTION # 4 of the ACT and
TITLE 4 U.S.C. Sec. 111., without APPORTIONMENT.
Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F2d at 1447 n.4.
50. Id. at 1447 (citing Lonsdale v. Smelser, 709 F.2d at 911).
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That tax laws are unconstitutional; That filing a tax return vio-
lates the privilege against self incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; That Federal Reserve
Notes do not constitute cash or income.5'
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's action, describing these
five defenses as "tired" and, when raised in civil litigation, as (in Judge
Easterbrook's words) "sanction-bait "
2
The Internal Revenue Service, in its brochure entitled "Why Do I
Have to Pay Taxes?, 53 includes some of these arguments as well, describing
them as "myths." Larry Becraft, with some exasperation, identifies thirty
Patriot arguments "destroyed" by the courts5 4 Why do these arguments
nonetheless proliferate? One reason might be strategic. Under the Su-
preme Court's ruling in United States v. Cheek,5 a person cannot be
criminally prosecuted for tax fraud unless the government can prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that he or she did not simply break the tax laws,
but did so willfully. A person has acted willfully if she knows that she is
legally obligated to pay taxes but she disagrees with the law or otherwise
chooses not to comply. A person has not acted willfully if she sincerely
believes that she has no tax liability 6 Thus, there is a legal incentive for
tax protester arguments to be not just wrong, but richly, densely, extrava-
gantly wrong. 7 The more obscure the argument, the more plausible it
might be that the taxpayer actually believed it.
51. United States v. Buckner, 830 F2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987).
52. Id. (citation omitted).
The Eighth Circuit has also shown a certain lack of patience with respect to tax
protesters. See, e.g., United States v. Moss, 604 F2d 569,570 (8th Cir. 1979) (upholding the
defendant's conviction on five counts of aiding and abetting the filing of false withholding
information based on a radio interview the defendant gave on how to avoid federal with-
holding tax); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F2d 619, 622-23 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding
the defendant's conviction on nine counts of aiding and abetting people to file false or
fraudulent income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7205 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, despite
evidence showing that aside from providing one person with a fraudulently completed W-
4 form, defendant's activities consisted of speaking at seminars); see Francis X. Sullivan, The
"Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority": The Legal Theories of the Sovereign Citizen
Movement, 1999 Wts. L. REv. 785, 816-17 (advocating aggressive prosecution of tax pro-
testers based on these precedents).
53. Why Do I Have to Pay Taxes?, supra note 46.
54. Larry Becrafi, Destroyed Arguments, Dixieland Law Journal, at http://
home.hiwaay.net/-becraft/deadissues.htm (last updated June 30,2003).
55. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
56. Id. at 201-02.
57. As a preventive measure, however, the majority drew a distinction between be-
ing mistaken about the law and disagreeing with the law that neatly placed tax protesters
on the wrong side:
Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional ...
do not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the Inter-
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Another reason why the same destroyed arguments seem to rise
eternally from the ashes might be the one identified by PT Barnum:
there's a sucker born every minute. New converts to the tax protest
movement likely are not aware of which arguments have already been
rejected. 8 The mainstream legal system remembers, however, and as the
same arguments are recycled over and over, the courts are increasingly
skeptical of the good faith in which litigants claim to offer them. These
claims are increasingly described as "frivolous," a word freighted with the
potential of monetary sanctions, and in the Seventh Circuit, cause for
sanction whether raised in a civil or a criminal case. 9
B. Of Guns and Militias
Of the various movements that generate legal populism, the militia
movement is far smaller than the "common law" and "personal sover-
eignty" movements described in subsequent Sections.60 The militia
nal Revenue Code. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at is-
sue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are
invalid and unenforceable. Thus in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years,
but after attending various seminars and based on his own study, he con-
cluded that the income tax laws could not constitutionally require him to
pay a tax.
We do not believe that Congress contemplated that such a taxpayer, without
risking criminal prosecution, could ignore the duties imposed upon him by
the Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms provided
by Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts and to abide by
their decisions.
Id. at 205-06.
58. Larry Becraft's "Dixieland Law Journal" has a section devoted to scam artists,
whom he calls out by name, "so that others may learn what has happened and protect
themselves." See Larry Becraft, Scams, Dixieland Law Journal, at http://home.hiwaay.net/
-becraft/scams.htm (last updated Nov. 29, 2002).
59. See United States v. Cooper, 170 E3d 691, 692 (7th Cit. 1999) (finding no rea-
son why sanctions for "frivolous squared" arguments-such as Cooper's arguments that
only residents ofWashington, D.C., and other federal enclaves are subject to the federal tax
laws because they alone are citizens of the United States, and that wages are not income
because they are compensation for working rather than a pure economic rent--cannot be
imposed under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in criminal as well as
civil cases).
60. See Daniel Lessard Levin & Michael W Mitchell, A Law unto Themselves: The
Ideology of the Common Law Court Movement, 44 S.D. L. Rav. 9,10 (1999):
A recent report by the Anti-Defamation League found that new Militia
groups have "expanded in only five states, remained relatively stable in about
20 states, and declined elsewhere" since the Oklahoma City bombing; militia
activists have instead been advising members to keep a low profile. In con-
trast, the common-law court and personal sovereignty movements have
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movement's emphasis on the need for revolutionary violence, however,
has attracted a great deal of media attention.
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution reads:
"A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state,
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.""'
There is little case law on the meaning of the Second Amendment, but an
enormous literature, much of it popular, has arisen concerning the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of gun control laws and the meaning of the
constitutional right to bear arms. Constitutional scholar David Williams
sums up the legal debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment
guarantee as one that has hardened into two opposing positions-the
"states' rights" position that the Amendment does not convey an individ-
ual right to bear arms, and the "individual rights" position that it does.62
Large mainstream organizations like the National Rifle Association
obviously prefer the second interpretation of the Second Amendment,
and they have assiduously promulgated it in academic, popular, and politi-
cal venues.13 The militia subculture also adheres to the individual rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment, albeit from a slightly different
direction. 4 Consider, for example, a document called the "Declarations of
Alteration and Reform," published by a group called the Committee of
the States in Congress and dated July 4, 1984.' 5 This document declares
that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, among other
agencies, is operating outside the United States Constitution and is thus
"hereby dissolved., 6  It concludes:
Wherein, the delegates of the sovereign states of the Union do
hereby declare as the COMMITTEE OF THE STATES as-
sembled IN CONGRESS, that the above adopted Articles of
the Declarations of Alteration and Reform are the "law of the
land." Any interference with the implementation and execu-
grown rapidly, with the Anti-Defamation League noting ever-increasing
cross-fertilization between militia and common-law court activists.
61. U.S. CoNST. amend. II.
62. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence, supra note 8.
63. See National Rifle Association of America, Institute for Legislative Action, NRA
and the Second Amendment, at http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=108
(last visited Apr. 19, 2005) ("Based on the English Common Law, the Second Amendment
guaranteed against federal interference with the citizen's right to keep and bear arms for
personal defense.").
64, Chuck Dougherty, The Minutemen, the National Guard and the Private Militia
Movement: Will the Real Militia Please Stand Up?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 959, 960-61
(1995).
65. Committee of the States in Congress, Declarations of Alteration and Reform, DUCK
CLuB NEws DIG. 3, no. 12 (1984), reprinted in ExTREMISM iN AMERICA 291-92 (Lyman
Tower Sargent ed., 1995).
66. r., reprinted in EXTSmiSM IN AMERICA, supra note 65, at 292.
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tion of said Articles shall be considered an act of SEDITION
against the government of these United States of America and
shall be punishable under the law. Any interference or attempt
to obstruct the functions of this Connittee of the States or
any of its delegates, shall result in imposition of the death pen-
alty upon conviction by the Committee sitting as the Congress
67of the United States.
This manifesto is the sort of thing that mainstream observers usually
dismiss with epithets like "loony," "irrational" and "paranoid." Yet this
radical opposition to the national government starts from intellectual
principles that are not that far from professional constitutional theory. For
example, Amar argues that federalism requires checks and balances be-
tween state and federal power in at least three areas: military, political, and
legal. 8 Under this view, state and local militias were envisioned under the
constitutional scheme as checks on the power of the national army:
The very existence of small but expandable popular "shadow"
armies organized by state governments could deter abuse of a
much larger professional standing army organized by the na-
tional government.... The national government could
forcefully put down any purely local coup or insurrection
threatening the republican government of a single state, but
could be thwarted in any genuine scheme of national tyranny
by an alliance of local militias led by state governments.' 9
Amar is quick to contain his suggestion by saying that resort to the
military can only be justified if political and legal challenges to national
power have failed-if the national courts have shut down or their judg-
ments are unenforceable and "the only applicable law is martial law,
enforced by gun and sword."70 But in the world of legal populism, politi-
cal and legal challenges have already failed, so we are already living under
martial law.
C. Brave New Legal World: The Common Law Movement
More significant than militias in terms of its effects on the main-
stream world is so-called "paper terrorism"-the use of legal documents
to harass public officials. The filing of pseudo-legal papers is associated
67. Id., reprinted in EXTREMISM IN AMERICA, supra note 65.
68. Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J 1425, 1494 (1987) [here-
inafter Amar, Of Sovereignty].
69. Id. at 1497.
70. Id. at 1499.
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with the so-called "conmon law court movement."7' Common law
courts represent a civil equivalent of private militias: they declare the ex-
isting legal infrastructure illegitimate and establish their own. Daniel
Levin and Michael Mitchell explain the phenomenon:
Once organized, common-law courts publish their rules in the
local newspapers and begin holding court sessions. These
common-law courts hold sessions in garages, restaurants,
churches, homes, convention centers, bingo parlors, hotel
rooms, and for one common-law court, a multi-use room at
the state capitol building. Judges are elected, or self-appointed,
and the number ofjudges varies from court to court although
the appointment of "twelve justices" is favored "in purview of
Chapter 45 of [the] Magna Carta" Common-law courts may
also appoint their own sheriffs, marshals, bailiffs, notaries, juries,
clerks, and other officers associated with the legitimate legal
system.
Enforcement of common-law courts' decisions first falls upon
local sheriffs, the only office that common-law courts recog-
nize as legitimate. In some instances after the local sheriffs have
not recognized their authority, common-law courts have ap-
pointed their own sheriffs and marshals who enforce the laws
of the court. There have even been instances when com-
mon-law court marshals have "burst into federal courtrooms
wearing official-looking badges and uniforms to serve their
papers." As a last resort, some common-law courts call upon
militia groups for enforcement when the "people have no
place to go but to the constitutional militia."
7 2
71. Daniel Levin and Michael Mitchell describe the 1980s farm crisis as a moment
when this activity reached a peak:
During this time, farmers faced with foreclosure began to file bogus land
patents which they believed would shield their property from any encum-
brances by state or local officials, including county sheriffi serving eviction
notices or warrants to seize their property. All of these attempts failed in the
courts in which they were heard. Such land patents only demonstrated that
the federal government no longer holds title to the land; none of the patents
canceled out interests held by other parties. The largest of these schemes,
promoted by a group called the National Agricultural Press Association
(NAPA), assured farmers that none of their loans acquired since 1974 were
legal and that they could have those loans declared null and void by filing
lawsuits and avoiding the use of lawyers.
Levin & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 14-15.
72. Id. at 29-30.
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Instances of physical violence against the state by legal populists-
such as those committed by militia group members-are sporadic and
frequently committed by "lone wolves," but acts of discursive violence
against public officials in particular and against the legal system more gen-
erally are a hallmark of the common law court movement. As Levin and
Mitchell observe, "Seeking to redress the grievances of their members,
activists reverse court rulings, issue threatening subpoenas, and generally
harass those they deem as enemies., 73 Sometimes harassment by activists
comes in retaliation for government action against one of their mem-
bers. 4 Levin and Mitchell note that common law activists have also
singled out particular state officials as political targets.7" Much of the activ-
ity of common-law courts involves the reversal of earlier rulings by
legitimate state and federal courts, including divorces and parental custody
disputes. 7 Sometimes, however, their activities are more ambitious; the
Montana-based Freemen, for example, apparently spearheaded a multi-
state trend of passing bad checks and money orders, based on the notion
that Federal Reserve Notes are not legal money."
These programs of harassment or legal "jamming" coexist with and
draw strength from a more positive project: the rediscovery by ordinary
Americans of the "common law tradition." For some legal populists, the
73. Id. at 31.
74. Mark Pitcavage, Anti-Defamation League, Common Law and Uncommon Courts:
An Overview of the Common Law Court Movement, Militia Watchdog Archives, at http://
www.militia-watchdog.org/common.htm (last updatedJuly 25, 1997).
75- Public officials and private citizens alike have been subjected to liens on their
property in retaliation for acts that bothered the Montana Freemen. Levin & Mitchell,
supra note 60, at 31-34.
76. Id. at 31.
77. Id. at 35. Levin and Mitchell provide greater detail about the nature of common
law court actions:
Common-law courts claim investigative powers, often demanding that the
accused parties appear before their court. If their order is refused, the court
"generally finds them guilty in absentia and issues punishment-liens and
threats of arrest,jailing, or death to be enforced by militia or the 'constable.' "
In some instances, common-law court activists have demanded that their cases
be removed from legitimate courts "into a superior court, Our One Supreme
Court." When such attempts fail, activists convene their common-law courts
anyway .The result is usually an acquittal, with an "indictment" being placed on
the judge presiding over the legitimate court. According to the U.S. Marshals
Service, common-law courts issued about 20 known "indictments" against fed-
eral judges nationwide. Similar "indictments" have been issued against local
judges throughout the country including the recent "common-law court"
indictments of ten municipal court judges in Orange County, California. In
enforcing one of these indictments, three men, in Arkansas, impersonated
U.S. Marshals and "attempted to arrest a municipal judge and bring him to a
Common Law court in Kansas."
Id. at 31-32.
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common law tradition is rooted in English history and stands for the ab-
solute protection of private property, the illegitimacy of"courts of equity"
and "law merchant" (which have usurped the rightful common law tradi-
tion), and thus the illegitimacy of any state or federal statutes abridging
private property rights." For others, the common law tradition is ulti-
mately rooted in the Christian Bible and the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Some websites concerning the common law are devoted to con-
structing histories of how the common law was usurped by other,
illegitimate forms of law. Others are devoted to reconstructing that law.
The Common Law Court of the United States of America, for example,
78. One website thus explains:
Since the formation of our Republic, the local County (or Parish) has always
been the seat of government for the body politic (the People).A County (or
Parish) government is the highest authority of government in our Republic
as it is closest to the body politic (the People) who are, in fact, THE
GOVERNMENT.
The Common Law of the States is founded and grounded upon substantive
titles in real property, and no mere legislative enactment by Congress, State
legislature or County Commissioners. Neither can judicial ruling by Federal,
State or County Courts operate to deprive the People of their Rights at Law,
including the Rights inherent in their Allodial Land Title Rights. The
Constitution of the United States of America, Article III, Section 2,
authorizes Courts of Law and Courts of Equity; Judicial Equity is
authorized; but nowhere does the Constitution of the United States of
America authorize a single bit of either Federal Executive branch of
government Equity jurisdiction, or Federal Legislative branch of government
Equity jurisdiction. In other words, the promulgation and enforcement of
Presidential/Congressional/udicial edicts, dictates, rules, regulations or
policies whether directly or through any Federal agent or agency such as the
FBI, CIA, EPA, OSHA, IRS, etc. or with the aid and assistance of State or
local lackeys is unauthorized.
HowAD FISHER & DALE POND, OUR AMERICAN CoMMON LAW, available at http://
www.svpvril.com/OACL.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
79. Thus, the "Common Law Review" announces:
THIS web site presents a new kind of conservatism, actually only a new-
seeming kind; it is rather the legacy of the Christian West: Common Law Review
is dedicated to the proposition that true conservatism hes "Beyond Whig and
Marxist" This brand of conservatism is dedicated to preserving and carrying
forward the legacy of Western civilization as it really stands, rather than in
either the denatured form of classical liberalism or the perverse organicism
of socialism, social democracy, fascism, communism.... The true nature of
Western civilization, which both liberalism and socialism have striven might-
ily to abolish, is Christian and classical, and it is legal: the legacy of
citizenship and liberty under law.
Welcome, Common Law Review, at http://www.commonlawreview.com/ (last visited Apr.
4, 2005) (alteration in original). The website contrasts the common law with the civil law
tradition. Id.
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declares its project as founding a new society bound together by the
common law and promises that this law will gradually supplant the (ille-
gitimate) federal law as the members of the new society introduce their
law into federal courts."'
Finally, concerns about citizen privacy have converged with legal
populism in a narrative concerning the federal government's efforts to
create a One World Government or New World Order through placing
all American citizens under surveillance.8 In this narrative, Social Security• , . 82
numbers and drivers' licenses are the first step toward this surveillance. A
new legal twist in this fight appears in a suit filed in an Alabama state court,
in which Lowell H. Becraft Jr. is representing Scott McDonald in an action
for declaratory judgment against the State Department of Motor Vehicles.
McDonald and his sons objected to the administrative rule under which
applicants for a driver's license were required to submit their Social Security
numbers. The legal basis for their objection was the First Amendment:
McDonald and his sons "believe that the federal SSN is at least the precur-
sor to the Biblical 'Mark of the Beast' described in Revelation," and
80. As the website declares:
The goal of these courses and this study material is to restart a common law
society such as the ones existing in this country in the last century. 100 years
of public law making has created a society that is contrary to our basic na-
ture as a Christian people. This process will allow a reformed jural society to
retain laws favorable to our inherent nature.
The College of Common Law, The Common Law Court of the United States of America, at
http://www.civil-liberties.com/commonlaw/common.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2004).
81. One author notes:
Both "an enemy" and a concept, the new world order represents a changing
relationship of power to space. Patriots believe that international organiza-
tions, spearheaded by the U.N., are busily working to form a one-world
government in which nation-states will no longer exist, American citizens
will lose their constitutional rights, and the U.S. will be forced to redistribute
its wealth and power to poorer countries. The result will be global commu-
nism.
Carolyn Gallaher, Mainstreaming the Militia, in SPACES OF HATE: GEOcRAPH-ES Or DiscRIMi-
NATION AND INTOLERANCE IN THE U.S.A.,supra note 20, at 186-87. Another asks:
What is the New World Order? In the Patriots' world, it is simply the same
dirty conspirators (the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral
Commission) who have been in cahoots with World Communism all these
years, and now they're creating pretexts for moving in with military equip-
ment and instituting a police state.
NEiWERT, supra note 17, at 5.
82. See, e.g., Resist Enumeration, at http://www.networkusa.org/fingerprint/
page6/fp-resist.htnl (last visited Apr. 11, 2005) (linking Social Security numbers with
plans to register every human being on the globe in a single database, and offering Bible-
based reasons why people should resist).
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therefore the Social Security number requirement violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause.83 This case joins other litigation on the issue taking a free
exercise approach. 4
D. The Sovereign Citizenry
As Professor Amar notes, during the American Revolution and im-
mediately after it, "constitutional debate focused on whether sovereignty
resided in government or in the People, and on how federalism should
operate within Empire and Confederation."8' The American revolutionary
116view was that true sovereignty resided in the People themselves. In one
sense this idea was not new: John Locke, for example, had recognized the
inalienable right of the People to alter or abolish their government
through the exercise of the transcendent right of revolution, and long be-
fore 1776 the British had exercised this right in the Glorious Revolution
of 1688.7
In another sense, however, the American view of sovereignty was
new. Eighteenth century English theorists like William Blackstone blunted
the possible radical implications of Locke's theory by arguing that the
King-in-Parliament-the government-embodied the sovereignty of the
People."' In contrast, the American view was that the People at all times
83. See Brief of Appellant Scott McDonald, McDonald v. Alabama Dep't of Pub.
Safety, (Ala. filed Oct. 30, 2001) (No. 1002114), available at http://www.networkusa.org/
(last visited Mar. 23, 2004). McDonald is also a legal populist who runs a pro-privacy web-
site called "Fight the Fingerprint." See Fight the Fingerprint!, at http://
www.networkusa.org/fingerprint.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).
84. See Callahan v.Woods, 736 E2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1984); Callahan v.Woods, 658
F2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y 1977); see also Leahy
v. District of Columbia, 833 F2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987);Yeager v. Hackensack Water Co.,
615 F Supp. 1087 (D.N.J. 1985).
85. Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 68, at 1429.
86. Id. at 1435.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 1431.As Amar explains:
God Almighty-the indivisible, unlimited sovereign of the universe-had
vested indivisible, unlimited temporal authority in the King, God's sovereign
agent on earth. After the English Civil War of the 1640's and the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, however, few in England embraced royal supremacy.
According to the new understanding, ultimate political authority derived not
from the divine right of kings, but from the consent of the governed. Le-
gitimacy flowed up from the People, not down directly from God. Yet the
unorganized polity at large could not effectively wield sovereign power on a
day-to day basis in fashioning and administering laws. At best, the People
could assert their power in those rare meta-legal moments, like the Glorious
Revolution itself, when one monarch was ousted and another consented to.
In ordinary times, then, where did effective sovereignty lie?
Vultures in Eagles' Clothing
retained full sovereignty: the government was only a representative, agent,
81
delegate, deputy, or servant of the People. James Wilson thus argued that
government never had "sovereignty,' only "power."90 Others, like Alexan-
der Hamilton, James Madison, John Marshall, and James Iredell, used the
word "sovereignty" to mean the government's power within its limited
sphere of delegation. 9' But the problem of how to make such a theory
workable in practice still remained. The Articles of Confederation eventu-
ally fell apart because the center did not hold with sovereignty placed in
the People of each state.
The new Constitution placed sovereignty in a different People: the
People of the United States. But, as Amar notes, this formulation did not
end the debate. As the Civil War approached, the question was what the
phrase "We the People" in the Constitution really meant. Did it represent
a sharp break from the Articles of Confederation? Was there now a new
national People? Or did the People of each state remain sovereign? On
one side, states' rightists argued that Americans had never become one
people; on the other, nationalists argued that Americans had been one
people since Independence. The middle ground, staked out by Chief
Justice Marshall in the nineteenth century, was that the many peoples
became one people through the ratification of the Constitution.
92
The eighteenth-century debate between the federalists and the anti-
federalists, and the nineteenth-century debate between the states' rightists
and the nationalists, still echo on the Internet. But the legal populists have
come to a different resolution than the professional constitutional scholars.
This difference can be seen clearly in the debate surrounding the
Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Amar argues that the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1866, offers a different vision of citizenship than
did the original Constitution and Bill of Rights:
The original Bill ... focused centrally on empowering the
people collectively against government agents following their
own agenda. The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, focused
on protecting minorities against even responsive, representative,
By the eighteenth century, the answer in Britain seemed clear: Sovereignty
resided in the King-in-Parliament, that indivisible entity consisting of King,
Lords, and Commons. Since all three "estates," or social orders, of the
realm-the one, the few, and the many--were "virtually represented," the
King-in-Parliament became the virtual embodiment of the abstract sover-
eignty of the People.
id.
89. Id. at 1436.
90. Id. at 1437 (citing R. Ross, The Federalists and the Problem of Sovereignty
(1984) (unpublished manuscript)).
91. Id. at 1450-51.
92. Id. at 1460-61.
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majoritarian government. Over and over, the 1789 Bill pro-
claimed the "right[s]" and "the powers" of "the people"-
phrases conjuring up civic republicanism, collective political
action, public rights, and positive liberty. The complementary
phrase in the 1866 Amendment-"privileges or immunities of
citizens"-indicates a subtle but real shift of emphasis, reflect-
ing a vision more liberal than republican, more individualistic
than collectivist, more private than public, more negative than
affirmative.
93
Meshing these two subtly different visions of constitutional govern-
ment together has been the subject of one of the greatest debates of the
twentieth century among lawyers, justices, and law professors: What is the
relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment?
One legal focus of this debate is the so-called doctrine of incorporation:
Does the Amendment "incorporate" the Bill, making the Bill's restrictions
on federal power applicable against the states?94 A second focus, more
pressing for our purposes, concerns the meaning of citizenship. Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment only states, "All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."95 The
Constitution provides no clear definition of national citizenship. Yet, as
Amar points out:
[I]f the People of America were sovereign, then one's Ameri-
can citizenship was all-important, and should never have been
treated as simply derivative of one's state citizenship under state
constitutions, or subject to virtually limitless manipulation by
ordinary legislation.... The complex legal issues concerning
the source of antebellum citizenship were never filly re-
solved.96
Some legal populists take up these same problems: the relationship
between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment generally and
the puzzle of national and state citizenship more specifically. But their
resolution is quite different. Whereas the professional constitutionalists
assume that the antebellum and Reconstruction Constitutions must
somehow be meshed together, the legal populists argue that the antebel-
lum Constitution and the Reconstruction Constitution are in effect two
separate Constitutions that create two different classes of citizenship. Un-
93. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1260-61 (1992).
94. Id. at 1194.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
96. Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 68, at 1464.
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der this theory, sovereign citizenship is the original form of citizenship
and carries with it the inalienable political rights enumerated in the Bill
of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment, in contrast, created a different
and inferior kind of citizenship, one which carries with it "civil rights,"
rights that are in fact mere privileges granted by the government and
revocable at its whim.Jared Held, SuiJuris, explains it in this way:
The "citizens of the United States" did not exist until after the
Civil War. In 1866, as the forerunner of the 14th amendment,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act. Through this law, Con-
gress created a new class of rights for freed former slaves who
were not included with these sovereign rights by the Treaty of
Peace and who, therefore, had no access to the courts. These
newly classified "persons" [My note: "persons," that is, as op-
posed to "People" who hold sovereignty] were thereby given
civil rights.
Civil rights were said to be the same as those that the state
Citizen already had, by virtue of his/her birth and blood.
Through the alleged "ratification" of the 14th Amendment and
later through the Social Security Act, these civil rights ex-
tended, through deliberate non-disclosure, to almost everyone
in America. As one request[s] a Social Security (account) num-
ber, one claims to be a U.S. citizen; all benefits and civil rights
then become part of the now converted "person's" life. In this
way, nearly everyone in the states has "voluntarily" [given] up
their inalienable rights, God-given fundamental rights and sov-
ereign status to [be] granted the "privileges and immunities" of
civil rights as subjects of Congress, i.e., U.S. citizens.97
Held goes on to explain that:
[O]ne's civil rights, unlike one's inalienable rights, are regulated
by the government (Congress), who grants them and who,
therefore, can take them away... People ... were informed of
their civil rights, not of their inalienable rights or sovereign
rights, because most Americans have been tricked into believ-
ing they are "citizens of the United States." Most have no idea
that by claiming U.S. citizenship, they voluntarily choose civil
rights instead of their natural birthright."
What are the implications of this very different theory of the rela-
tionship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment?
97. Jared M. Held, Rights, Packet Storm, at http://packetstormsecurity.nl/
poisonpen/govtxts/rights.txt (last updated Apr. 16,1997).
98. Id.
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First is the legalistic idea that by discovering and proclaiming your true
Sovereign Citizenship, the federal government no longer has any claim on
you-which includes the government's claim of tax liability. Thus, one
can purchase books such as Vultures in Eagle's Clothing,99 which "will show
you how to change your current acquired legal status of'Voluntary U.S.
Enslaved Subject' back to your original born Status of 'Freeborn Sover-
eign American Citizen' who has the same Rights and prerogatives as the
King of England.' "'0 I've called this notion legalistic, but of course it is
also profoundly romantic. It draws on the American penchant for con-
spiracies, the fantasy that there really is another, secret America behind the
facade of this one, and that with an act of will one can simply step
through the door to a world in which one can be reborn as the King of
England ... and, of course, not have to pay any taxes.
A second and more troubling implication of this theory is that only
certain people can be Sovereign Citizens while others are relegated to
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship only. The precedent for this, of
course, is the Dred Scott case:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both de-
scribe the political body who, according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and
conduct the Government through their representatives. They
are what we familiarly call the "sovereign people' and every
citizen is one of these people, and a constituent member of this
sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of per-
sons described in the plea in abatement [i.e. negroes] compose
a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this
sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not in-
cluded, and were not intended to be included, under the word
"citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of
the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for
and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary,
they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those
who held the power the Government might choose to grant
them. 1
99. LYNNE MEREDITH, VULTURES IN EAGLE'S CLOTHING (1994).
100. Re: The Buck Act, Mirrors, at http://web.elastic.org/-fche/mirrors/old-usenet/
irs-words-of-art (last visited May 5, 2005).
101. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,404-05 (1856).
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Now we are finally in a position to make sense of Senator Rogers'
affidavit, with which I began this Article: "I, Donald A. Rogers, being of
sound mind and lawful age, do solemnly declare: I was born in Louisiana
State of parents who were [W]hite, who were Citizen-Principals and
whose parents time out of mind were and always had been [White"'
1 2
The main purpose of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was, in-
deed, to establish the citizenship of the Negro by overruling Dred Scott.
"And because such a [Wihite man's citizenship was not restricted by the
14th Amendment and because he receives no protection from it, he has
no reciprocal obligation to a 14th Amendment allegiance or sovereignty
and owes no obedience to anyone under the 14th Amendment."10 3 For
the Sovereign Citizen, Reconstruction never occurred.
II. INTERPRETING LEGAL POPULISM
Legal populism is a subversive movement. All tax evasion and fraud
is politically subversive, particularly in a society where one's status as a
taxpayer is an important index of citizenship. But those who avoid paying
taxes or seek to pay less than the governmlent allows on the ground that
our taxation system is itself unlawful are subversive in a particularly inter-
esting way. Tax protesters, and legal populists more generally, attempt to
use the machinery of law to defeat the law. They refuse to be represented
by lawyers and file massive papers in court citing obscure and overruled
cases. They cite as authority sources that mainstream lawyers believe to be
empty of content, like the Declaration of Independence, or lacking in
legitimacy, like Black's Law Dictionary or Bouvier's Law Dictionary."" They
pursue their own legal actions against the government and its officers,
often filing multiple claims that repeat the same assertions. As in the
Common Law movement, they sometimes create their own legal fora and
anoint their own counter-authorities.
One popular mainstream reaction to legal populists is to depict them
as living outside the bounds of rationality.05 In this conception, legal popu-
lists are both ridiculous and to be feared.They are the cultural equivalent of
people who push heavily-laden shopping carts down the street while
mumbling to themselves; or the collective equivalent of John Walker
Lindh-the domestic face of anti-American terrorism; or an ideological
102. Gunnison, supra note 2.
103. Id.
104. A recent article by a law librarian explores the different communities consti-
tuted by people who rely on BLAcK's LAw DiCTIONARY and people who rely on BouVIER's
LAW DICTIONARY. Mary Whisner, Practicing Reference .. Bouvier's, Black's, and Tinkerbell, 92
LAW LIBR.J. 99 (2000).
105. See, e.g., Judy Thomas, Movement's Leadership Left in Disarray: Lives Have Mirrored
the Groups' Rise, Fall, KAMsAs Cny STAR, Mar. 20, 2005, at A9, available at 2005 WLNR
4315541.
SPRING 20051
MichiganJournal of Race & Law
arm of racist extremist groups like the Ku Klux Klan, repudiated by con-
temporary America yet lingering menacingly in the shadows. A somewhat
more sympathetic reaction, popular in the late-1980s, is to see them as
ordinary but uneducated folks who innocently fall prey to a few extrem-
ists during economic hard times. Finally, legal populists are sometimes
understood as religious fanatics, people who inappropriately use the frame
of the divine to understand social practices that are in reality wholly secu-
lar.""6 Although each of these perspectives is useful, in this section and the
next I put forth three additional accounts of legal populism, with the in-
tent of moving deeper into both sympathy and critique than typical
mainstream accounts.
A. Legal Populism as Conspiracy Theory
As Richard Hofstadter's famous essay, The Paranoid Style in American
Politics, observes, politics is made not only by elites, but also by the public;
in the public sphere, "political life acts as a sounding board for identities,
values, fears, and aspirations."' 7 For Hofstadter, with the help of new
106. Susan Koniak's otherwise brilliant reading of legal populist narratives suffers a
bit firom this perspective, I think. See Koniak, supra note 5. Komak uses Robert Cover's
theories of nomos and narrative, which are based on the interweaving of Talmudic and legal
theories and practices of interpretation, to explain the legal populist world. See Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4
(1983). This is strikingly appropriate, given the close connection of much of legal popu-
lism to Christian Identity ideology, which of course is explicitly religious and
fundamentalist. On the other hand, Koniak's reading of legal populism seems to identify
the discomfiting relationship between popular and professional constitutionalism as purely
a matter of using the wrong frame, the religious instead of the secular. This understanding,
in turn, activates the usual binaries trotted out to describe the gun culture, for example:
city versus rural, religious fundamentalist versus secular humanist, and so on. The reading
Daniel Levin and Michael Mitchell offer-legal populism as social contract fundamental-
ism-is more satisfactory in my view, in that it suggests at once the distance from and the
closeness to certain professional legal projects.
107. RIcHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID S YLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS ix (1966). Hofstadter's essay set the framework for an extensive literature in political
and cultural studies on conspiracy theorizing and paranoia in American life. See, e.g.,JoHN H.
BUNZEL, ANTI-POLITICS IN AMERICA (1967); CossPiRACY:THE FEAR Or SUBVERSION IN AMEis-
cAN HIsTORY (Richard 0. Curry & Thomas M. Brown eds., 1972); SEYMouR MARTIN LipsETr
& EARL RAAB, THE POLITICS or UNREASON: RIGHT WING ExTREMisM IN AMERICA, 1790-
1970 (1970); ThE FEAR OF CONSPIRACY: IMAGES OF UN-AMERICAN SUBVERSION fROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (David Brian Davis ed., 1971).
More recently another spate of books on conspiracy theory and the "paranoid
style" in American politics has arisen. Some works in this vein include, for example, GREG-
ORY S. CAMP, SELLING FEAR: CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND END-TIMES PARANOIA (1997);
CONSPIRACY NATION: THE POLITICS OF PARANOIA IN PosTWAR AMERICA (Peter Knight ed.,
2002) [hereinafter CONSPIRACY NATION]; PETER KNIGHT, CONSPIRACY CULTURE; FROM THE
KENNEDY ASSASSINATION TO "THE X-FuIEs" (2000); TIMOTHY MELLEY, EMPIRE OF CON-
spiRACY: THE CULTURE OF PARANOIA IN PosTwAR AMERICA (2002); PATRICK O'DoNNELL,
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technologies of mass communication, politics becomes not only a site of
reasoned debate about the institutions and processes that regulate our
common lives, but also a theater in which images and emotions can be
projected and played out. 08
Hofstadter identified a distinctive "paranoid style" in politics. Con-
spiracy theorizing is a paradigmatic example of politics in the public
sphere expressed in the paranoid style, and one way to understand legal
populism is to treat it as a form of conspiracy theory. Certainly as a sub-
stantive matter, conspiracy theory and legal populism overlap considerably.
The constitutional literature of tax protest, for example, provides an easy
portal into venerable conspiracy theories. The first step is to recognize
that the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Reserve Bank are le-
gally rogue organizations because they are ungrounded in the original
Constitution. The second step is to see them politically as a threat to lib-
erty because of their enormous power over ordinary citizens; because of
the secrecy and obscurantism with which they operate; and because they
are controlled by elites, enabling a small group of people to amass wealth
and power for themselves at the expense of the masses. The third step is to
recognize the link between these rogue organizations and the larger con-
spiracy to establish a global New World Order. The idea of the New
World Order is that a small coterie of bankers and politicians, using inter-
national political institutions such as the United Nations, will create a
unified world government and through this project achieve political and
economic tyranny over the rest of the world.109 From here it is only a
small step into the sordid depths of Christian Identity doctrine"0 and the
LATENT DESTINIES: CULTURAL PARANOIA IN CONTEMPORARY U.S. NARRATIVE (2000); DANIEL
PIPES, CONSPIRACY: How THE PARANOID STYLE FLOURISHES AND WHERE IT COMES FROM
(1997); ROBERT S. ROBINS & JERROLD M. POST, POLITICAL PARANOIA: THE PSYCHOPOLITICS
OF HATRED (1997).
108. HOFSTADTER, supra note 107, at 63.As Hofstadter opined:
The growth of the mass media of communication and their use in politics
have brought politics closer to the people than ever before and have made
politics a form of entertainment in which the spectators feel themselves in-
volved. Thus it has become, more than ever before, an arena in which private
emotions and personal problems can be readily projected. Mass communica-
tions have made it possible to keep the mass man in an almost constant state
of political mobilization.
Id.
109. See supra note 81.
110. MITCHELL, supra note 4. See generally JAMES A. Aso, THE POLITICS OF RIGHT-
EOUSNESS: IDAHO CHRISTIAN PATRiOTISM 85 (1990). Anthropologist Richard Mitchell
describes the ideology of Identity Christianity briefly:
Identity Christians (called Identity "Christians," by some) continue a theo-
logical line of argument begun by Edward Hine in nineteenth-century
England and rejuvenated in post-World War II United States by Wesley Swift
and his followers. Distinctive Identity tenets are few but stand in dramatic
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old canards of anti-Semitism, such as the claim that Jews, bankers, financi-
ers, and internationalists are working in secret to control the course of
political events.
Another example of the link between legal populism and conspiracy
theory is the idea, popular within legal populism, that we in the United
States are living under a false legal system (identified variously as "law
merchant," "equity," or "maritime law"), and that a conspiracy exists to
perpetuate this false legal system as a way of tricking Americans out of their
true rights. The ultimate roots of this conspiracy are disputed. One website,
for instance, locates the beginnings of the supplanting of the common law
by admiralty law in the doings of the George Rapp Harmony Society, a
nineteenth-century utopian community founded by one George Rapp in
1805.' As the website declares,
Evidence will show that the tremendous wealth accumulated
by this society was subsequently used to fashion a George
Rapp Society on a much larger scale-with plans to ultimately
encompass the world in a "superstate" controlled and governed
by mercantile interests, under the law of admiralty-a super-
state wherein all the property in the world, and all the people
on space-ship "Earth," are pledged to the benefit of
this World-wide mercantile association. The "New World
Order?" 112
Other legal populists identify bankers, bureaucrats, or internationalists as
the shadowy figures behind the conspiracy."3 Still others focus on particu-
contrast to mainstream belief. In Identity doctrine the biblical Lost Tribes
migrated from the Middle East to settle the "Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, Scandina-
vian, Teutonic" nations of western Europe and North America. The United
States, not Israel, is the genuine promised new Holy Land. White aryans are
the authentic Israelites. Jews are said to be descended from Cain, the literal
spawn of Eve and Satan, and are the mortal enemies of Identity Christians.
Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and other non[W]hites, the "mud peoples," are said
to have branched from the evolutionary tree long before Adam, the first
"[Wihite" Homo sapiens appeared, making them spiritually soulless and cul-
turally and intellectually on a par with higher animals.
MITCHEIL, supra note 4, at 122-23.
111. Eldon G. Warman, The British Legal System of Mixed Common and Roman Law
Has Been Used to Enslave US(A), DetaxCanada, available at http://www.detaxcanada.org/
cmlawl .htm (last visited Mar. 23,2004).
112. Id.
113. For example, John Trochmann, leader of the Militia of Montana ("MOM"),
identifies as conspirators "the President, the Speaker of the House, and most financial and
political leaders around the world." NEIWRT, supra note 17, at 17. The United Nations is
also a popular target of fear and hatred. As one commentator observes, "The Posse Comi-
tatus website contains an image of the U.S. flag, the Stars and Stripes, fusing with the flag
of the United Nations under the caption 'Which Will It Be?' "Another author notes:
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lar techniques used to further the conspiracy, such as the manipulation of
public opinion and, of course, failing to inform people of their true
rights.
Legal populism and conspiracy theory are linked not only substan-
tively but also in terms of common interpretive practices. Many legal
populist texts exhibit both the desire for and endless deferral of a secret
answer (frequently deferred on websites for the purpose of getting the
reader to pay money for the book, video, or kit), and the painful but also
giddy excess of meaning this endless interpreting brings about. By reject-
ing the traditional means by which professional legal insiders produce
interpretive closure-most notably, the acceptance of the Supreme Court
as the final authoritative arbiter of "what the law is"-legal populists in-
troduce the possibility of endless interpretation."'
Legal populists also produce the possibility of endless interpretation
by rejecting the limits professional legal interpreters place on what consti-
tutes a legitimate text for interpretation. Legal populists find meaning in
signs professionals find meaningless. For some, the fact that certain Ameri-
can flags in courtrooms have a gold fringe betrays that these are admiralty
courts and not courts of United States domestic law.
'1 6
Capitalization is also an important resource for hidden meaning
within legal populism. For some legal populists, a party's name when
written entirely in capital letters represents a different legal entity than
when only the initial letters are capitalized.1 1 7 Other writers, noting that
The Viper Militia Website shows a cartoon of a S.WA.T. team of law en-
forcement officers wearing U.N. armbands raiding an anti-government
activist's home .... The image is one of the "glocalization" of police power,
the fusing of local and global law enforcement agencies to form a violent
and anonymous force that threatens innocent citizens.
Flint, supra note 20, at 173.
114. See, e.g., The Delphi Technique, Dixieland Law Journal, at http://home.hiwaay.net/
-becraft/Delphi.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) (describing various means of manipulating
survey and focus group results allegedly developed by the Rand Corporation in the early
1960s).
115. Levin & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 39-40.
116. But see McCann v. Greenway, 952 F Supp. 647, 648 (WD. Mo. 1997) (rejecting
conspiracy claim following child custody case when plaintiff's "main complaint is that the
state court did not have jurisdiction over the custody dispute because the court flew a
'maritime flag of war,' which invested the court with admiralty jurisdiction to the exclu-
sion of its lawful jurisdiction over family law disputes");Vella v. McCammon, 671 F Supp.
1128, 1129 (S.D.Tex. 1987) ("The remaining claims that Petitioner has asserted by way of
motion to dismiss, e.g. Court lacking jurisdiction because the Court's flag has yellow
fringes on it, were denied and the Court considers them to have not only been without
merit but also to have been totally frivolous.").
117. Jon Roland, Typographic Conventions in Law, at http://home.hiwaay.net/-becraft/
NameslnCapshtm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). But see, e.g., Russell v. United States, 969 F
Supp. 24, 25 (WD. Mich. 1997) (holding frivolous petitioner's argument that "he is not
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Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United
States in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish,"'l sometimes argue that
the lower case spelling of "supreme" in that clause and in Article I means
that "the United States Supreme Court of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is not
the supreme Court of Article III ' ""9
The careful delineation of Patriot theorists between "citizenship"
and "Citizenship" provides another example of the importance of capitali-
zation. According to some Patriot narratives, "Sovereign Citizenship is the
original form of citizenship, and carries with it the inalienable political
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights." 2 ' In contrast, "Fourteenth
[A]mendment citizenship is a second class citizenship, one which carries
with it only 'civil rights,' rights that are in fact mere privileges granted by
the government and revocable at the government's whim.' 2' The diver-
gence between these two forms of citizenship can be tracked by
observing that the word "citizen" is always capitalized in the Constitution
until 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.'22
subject to the summons"); Rosenheck & Co. v. United States, 79 A.FT.R.2d (RIA) 2715
(N.D. Okla. 1997) ("The Court expressly finds that Defendant WALTER EDWARD
KOSTICH JR. is the person identified in the Notice of Levy, irrespective of the commas,
capitalization of letters, or other alleged irregularities Kostich identifies as improper. Simi-
larly, the Court's finding applies to the filed pleadings in this matter."); United States v.
Washington, 947 F. Supp. 87, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding "baseless" the contention that
the defendant's name "spelled out in capital letters, is a fictitious name used by the Gov-
ernment to tax him improperly as a business").
Jon Roland of the Constitution Society has this to say about beliefs about capitali-
zation in the Patriot community:
One of the persistent myths among political dissidents is that such usages as
initial or complete capitalization of names indicates different legal entities or
a different legal status for the entity. They see a person's name sometimes
written in all caps, and sometimes written only in initial 'caps, and attribute a
sinister intent to this difference. They also attach special meanings to the
ways words may be capitalized or abbreviated in founding documents, such
as constitutions or the early writings of the Founders.
Such people seem to resist all efforts to explain that such conventions have
no legal significance whatsoever, that they are just ways to emphasize certain
kinds of type, to make it easier for the reader to scan the documents quickly
and organize the contents in his mind.
Roland, supra.
118. U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
119. See KONIAX, supra note 5, at 72.
120. See Scott Eric Rosenstiel, Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship, at http://www.civil-
liberties.com/pages/art2.html (last visited Apr. 25, 1996).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Sometimes the gap between popular and professional constitutional-
ism reflects convention more than substance. For example, one online
article raises the interesting and legally legitimate question of what
United States citizenship meant before and after passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 1 3 Its main source of legal authority, however, is
Black's Law Dictionary. At other times, the gap seems due to the different
interpretive methods of professional constitutional scholarship and legal
populism. Legal populism, influenced by the interpretive methods of con-
spiracy theory, assumes the existence of secret meanings and hieroglyphs,
whereas professional constitutionalism assumes that there is only one law
and that it is (in theory) transparently available to all; there is only surface,
no depth.
The result is that legal populist analysis, though it resembles legal
reasoning, turns legal reasoning on its head. Where legal insiders stake
their claim to the law's legitimacy and primacy over "politics" on the idea
that legal reasoning is a stable, "closed" interpretive practice that aspires to
the prestige of science, the outsiders who maintain legal populism turn
law into an "open" discourse, a practice that endlessly generates more and
more interpretation.124
Legal populism resembles conspiracy theorizing as well in the
emotions it generates and in the invitations it offers to the participant. It
invites one not only to be outraged and frightened by the efforts of various
conspiracies to usurp the rights of American citizens but also to be
enlightened and empowered to claim one's own rights (usually by
purchasing something). The dethroning of the state's monopoly over
interpretation itself is empowering. Private legal interpretation makes
possible the collective founding of new legal worlds, as in the Common
Law Court of the United States of America. It also promises individuals
emancipation from the bureaucracies that govern most citizens' everyday
lives. Indeed, the do-it-yourself mentality of legal populism offers a
capacity for agency seldom found in everyday public life.
B. Conspiracy Theory as Political Practice
Although Hofstadter saw the paranoid style as a long-standing but
ultimately minor strain in American politics, more recently cultural stud-
ies academics have argued that it has become ubiquitous. Peter Knight
notes that "we're all conspiracy theorists now."1 Timothy Melley agrees:
"Conspiratorial explanations have become a central feature of American
political discourse, a way of understanding power that appeals to both
123. See id.
124. On closed and open discourses, see Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in
Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1572-73 (1990)-
125. KNiGHT, supra note 107, at 6.
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marginalized groups and the power elite."1 26 In this section and the one
that follows, I explore both perspectives: conspiracy theorizing generally
and legal populism in particular as a symptom of modern political culture
generally, and as the voice of a specific subculture.
If it is true, as some authors contend, that conspiracy theorizing has
become a "central feature of American political discourse"' 7 why is this
so? Several social theorists argue that conspiracy theorizing is the result of
a shock wave generated when deeply-rooted narratives of individualism
and agency hit the reality of a world increasingly controlled by large, im-
personal forces: economic, political, and ecological. In this world, selves
are asked to respond with an ever-increasing velocity and flexibility to an
onslaught of information and disciplinary demands. 2 1 William Connolly
describes this contemporary predicament vividly, in what is perhaps the
academic equivalent of apocalyptic fiction:
There is, first, an intensification of the experience of owing
one's life and destiny to world-historical, national, and local-
bureaucratic forces. There is, second, a decline in the confi-
dence many constituencies have in the probable future to
which they find themselves contributing in daily life. There is,
third, an even more ominous set of future possibilities that
weigh upon life in the present. ' 9
According to Connolly, the first element of this predicament is an
intensification of social discipline: "One must now program one's life
meticulously to meet a more detailed array of institutional standards of
normality and entitlement."'30 The second element is the now well-
known disenchantment of broad swaths of the public with political
representatives and politics generally.'3' The third element is the threat of
various sorts of disaster:
Thus climactic changes generated by late-industrial society
may eventually sink large chunks of inhabitable and arable land
under the sea; crises in essential supplies of oil or safe water or
good soil or oxygen may flow from the effort to industrialize
the entire world; state and nonstate terrorism may escalate into
a condition of continuous insecurity and violence unconfined
by state boundaries; and the impotency of a late-modern state
126. Timothy Melley, Agency Panic and the Culture of Conspiracy, in CONSPIRACY NA-
TION, supra note 107, at 57.
127. Id.
128. WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIc NEGOTIATIONS OF
POLITICAL PARADox 24-25 (1991) (describing the "globalization of contingency").
129. Id. at 20.
130. Id. at 21.
131. Id. at 23.
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or a nonstate fragment may produce a nuclear exchange that
destroys civilization or removes human life from the face of
the earth.
132
Conspiracy theory thus expresses both the desire for political agency
and the fear that such agency is no longer possible. In the academic litera-
ture, this idea comes in various shades of sympathy or contempt for the
conspiracy theorists themselves. With more than a whiff of condescension
toward the mass man, Fredric Jameson describes conspiracy theorizing as
"the poor person's cognitive mapping in the postmodern age; it is a de-
graded figure of the total logic of late capital, a desperate attempt to
represent the latter's system.'' 133 More recent writers see conspiracy theo-
rists as less "poor" and "desperate:' and as more representative of everyone.
Mark Fenster argues that those who see key world-historic decisions be-
ing made by tiny elites have, after all, a point: "[O]ne need not ... assume
that the state is the direct instrument of a hidden, transhistorical ruling
class or elite to recognize the degree to which economic and political
power are concentrated in the hands of a tiny sector of the national and
international population." 34 Fenster describes conspiracy theorizing as a
response to "the tendency toward excluding real social antagonisms and
debate from the public sphere, and the logic of control that has come to
permeate the decaying institutions, structures, and spaces that compose
what remains of civil society."135 For Fenster, "the conspiracy narrative
needs to be recognized for what it is: a utopian desire to understand and
confront the contradictions and conflicts of contemporary capitalism."
1 36
Jodi Dean argues that the torrent of information, some accurate and
much not, available through the Internet necessarily makes everyone into
a conspiracy theorist. 13 Dean notes that both the endless drive for more
132. Id. at 24-25.
133. Fran Mason, A Poor Person's Cognitive Mapping, in CONSPIRAcY NATION, supra
note 107, at 40 (quoting Fredric Jameson, Cognitive Mapping, in MARXISM AND THE INTER-
PRETATION OF CutruR 356 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988)).
134. FENS-MR, supra note 7, at 63.
135. Id. at 69.
136. Id. at 116.
137. Jodi Dean, IfAnything Is Possible, in CONSPIRACY NATION, supra note 107, at 88-
89:
Like conspiracy theorists, we're imbricated in evidence and suspicion. We're
entangled in a world of uncertainties, a world where more information is
available, and hence, a world where we face daily the fact that our truths, di-
agnoses, and understandings are incomplete-click on one more link, check
out one more newscast, get just one more expert opinion (and then, perhaps,
venture into the fringe; after all, some HMOs cover alternative remedies)....
The sense that anything might be possible haunts the interface of national
and global, modern and postmodern power formations. It is an uneasy sense
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and more interpretation toward a closure that can never take place and
the "pleasure in pain" that constructing conspiracy theories produces is a
response to contemporary "technoculture" and an age of ever-proliferating
information, symbolized by the World Wide Web and what she calls
"cyberia." 3 1
Timothy Melley, examining American conspiracy thinking-post-
World War II, argues that conspiracy theorizing results from the attempt
to come to terms with the social theorist's familiar dilemma of agency
versus structure. 3 1 What he terms "agency panic" emerges from the desire
to preserve the fantasy of perfect individual power, freedom, and responsi-
bility that constitutes an essential element of the American Dream, while
at the same time taking account of the undeniable fact, made vivid in the
popular culture of the 1950s and 1960s, that behavior can be manipulated
and that the "self" is thus much more vulnerable than the fantasy sug-
gests. Conspiracy theory is thus attractive-and wholly American, one
might add-in the way that it imagines the possibility of pure agency, set-
ting up a clean battle between heroic individuals and sinister forces rather
than recognizing the always compromised nature of agency in the midst
of structural constraint.
As I have suggested, conspiracy theory is embedded in legal popu-
lism. But where conspiracy theory alone seems to offer only the rush and
of the links that have not yet been made, a sense expressed as conspiracy the-
ory.
138. Id. (describing "cyberia").
139. Melley, supra note 126, at 62.
140. Id. at 77-78. Melley writes:
[Conspiracy culture] stems from a paradoxical desire to conserve one of the
central fantasies of liberalism-the notion that Eve Sedgwick has called
"pure voluntarity" an absolute freedom from social control. But in the post-
war period this fantasy has come under considerable stress, and the postwar
rhetoric of diminished individual agency has often registered this stress with
a sense of shock or surprise. Texts from the last half of the twentieth century
are replete with the frightening "discovery" that human behavior can be
regulated by social messages and communications. What is striking about
such texts is their concomitant assumption that, once revealed, social controls
should be so ubiquitous, so effective, so total. It is this all-or-nothing concep-
tion of agency that in turn feeds the imaginative projection of the liberal
self-with all its rationality, autonomy, and self-enclosure--onto the level of
the social order, onto the very bureaucracies, information-processing systems,
communication networks, and institutions that seemed so threatening in the
first place. The most significant cultural function of these texts has been to
sustain an increasingly embattled notion of individualism. Conspiracy theory,
paranoia, and anxiety about human agency, in other words, are all part of the
paradox in which a supposedly individualist culture conserves its individual-
ism by continually imagining it to be in imminent peril.
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anxiety of endlessly proliferating clues to an endlessly deferred truth, legal
populism offers a sturdier resolution of the dramas of agency and power it
presents. In this respect, legal populism strongly resembles survivalism. In
his book Dancing at Armageddon, cultural anthropologist Richard Mitchell
investigates the "troubles that might be coming to America, and the peo-
ple looking forward to them.""' These troubles include "environmental
catastrophe, economic collapse, seditious insurrection, widespread civil
strife, internecine race war, thermonuclear holocaust, invasions from
within, abroad, or above, and other calamities."' 4 2 Survivalism as an Ameri-
can cultural practice relies on a narrative Mitchell calls a "survival
scenario." Mitchell writes, "Survival scenarios exhibit four essential crite-
ria: they posit conditions that are global, caused, amenable to technique, and
susceptible to individual solutions.' '143 Survivalists tell stories about the
troubles to come and identify the shadowy elites behind them, but they
are even more interested, argues Mitchell, in developing the knowledge
and skills necessary to weather these troubles when they arrive.'44 Buying
firearms and learning how to use them, building bomb shelters, buying
and hoarding freeze-dried food, and going off the power grid are all
forms of survivalist social creativity'
45
In the narratives of legal populism, the troubles described are politi-
cal not environmental, but they offer the same tantalizing promise of
cultural creation. Legal populism, like survivalism more generally, rests on
the creation of survival scenarios. The betrayal of the American people by
the forces of secret societies; global finance; and national, possibly interna-
tional, political elites is a crisis that affects the entire nation and eventually
the world (at least if the New World Order is successfully put into place,
as the elites hope). This betrayal was not divinely caused but came about
141. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 3.
142. Id.
143. Id. Mitchell elaborates:
Survival scenarios build on plights that are global, not individuated. Survival
problems are not merely circumstantial or random. There are logical, secular
reasons for these problems. Survivalism is not action toward manifestations of
inscrutable divine will or inexorable historical process. The problems con-
fronted are caused by agents, agencies, and processes survivaasts may discover
and understand with appropriate effort and access to relevant information.
Once understood, survival problems are amenable to technique-
combinations of resources, rational procedures, and standardized practices
potentially at hand. Finally, the solution to survival problems lies with indi-
viduals and small groups, not collectives. Survivalism is the exercise of
individual skill and will, the expenditure of personal effort and possessions,
not political activism, community organization, or a social movement.
Id. at 242 n.9.
144. See id. at 9-10.
145. Id.
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for specific historical reasons, and much of legal populism involves tracing
this history and pinpointing just where the corruption began. The theft of
the true Constitution and its recovery are, moreover, luckily both amena-
ble to technique and susceptible to individual and collective solutions.
Essential to both legal populism and survivalism generally is the pos-
sibility of agency through technical mastery Survivalists take pride in their
mastery over the physical and craft skills necessary to survive mass natural
and/or political disaster. Legal populists seek to develop a different kind of
mastery. By personal study, collective investigation, and (of course) pur-
chasing the right guidebooks and products, ordinary people can learn to
read and understand the law-one of the most complex and abstruse
bodies of text in existence, and one with enormous power in modern
society. Indeed, legal populism offers the possibility of mastery over the
law, the ability to know what is true and what is false, not by relying on
someone's authority but by wielding key texts that make internal analysis
and critique possible. In this way legal populism, in its practical aspect,
offers the promise of individual solutions, not (only) by learning to make
one's own gas masks or to fire a gun, but by learning the law. Learning the
law, in turn, creates political agency The delegitimation of the United
States government and the reestablishment of legitimate legal authority is
only a land patent or tax return away.
Scholars of conspiracy frequently identify contemporary capitalism
as the major social institution which conspiracy theorists and survivalists
resist. With respect to legal populism, however, politics is the key site of
struggle, To the extent that legal populism holds out hope for political
reconstruction and re-empowerment through the rediscovery of the true
law and the restoration of the Sovereign Citizen's relationship to that law,
its narratives can be understood as nostalgia for relations of power that
have long been eclipsed by other, more modern forms of domination.
Indeed, its narratives can be understood as nostalgia for relations of power
that never actually existed.
Michel Foucault is often cited as saying that in contemporary soci-
ety, institutional power appears in at least three different forms that form a
mutually supporting triangle: sovereign or juridical power, disciplinary
power, and governmentality. Foucault suggests in a famous passage,
146. For Fenster, "the conspiracy narrative needs to be recognized for what it is: a
utopian desire to understand and confront the contradictions and conflicts of contempo-
rary capitalism." FENSTER, supra note 7, at 116. Mitchell similarly identifies consumer
capitalism, or "Planet Microsoft," as survivalism's foe. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 200.
147. See, e.g., ALAN HUNT, EXPLiORATIONS IN LAW AND SociETY: TOWARD A CONSTITU-
rrv TCEoRY OF LAW 310-11 (1993). Foucault describes sovereign power as emanating
from the will of a political subject, a sovereign. It is centralized and centralizing. In earlier
times, of course, the sovereign was a king; in contemporary democratic theory the king
has been deposed and the People speaking through their representanves are the sovereign.
Nevertheless, Foucault argues, the idea of a central will effectuating its wishes remains at
the center of contemporary theories of political sovereignty. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Two
[VOL. 10:269
Vultures in Eagles' Clothing
moreover, that the old discourse of sovereignty acquires a new and sinister
usefulness in the modern era, because theories of sovereign power may
obscure and give legitimacy to domination that takes place through disci-
plinary means. 11 From a Foucaultian perspective, legal populists might be
understood as resisting both governmentality and the discipline of experts
and seeking instead the restoration of S/sovereignty.
Their creativity in re-imagining citizenship as Sovereign Citizenship
is reminiscent of Kirstie McClure's ruminations about the meaning of
rights talk in the work of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century politi-
cal theorists Malthus, Owen, and Hazlitt. 49 McClure's concern is whether
any political space exists outside Foucault's triangle, or whether resistance
Lectures, in POWER/KNoWLEDGE: SELECTED INTEIRVIFWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977,
at 94 (Cohn Gordon ed., 1980) ("I believe that the King remains the central personage in
the whole legal edifice of the West."). Law appears in this theory as the command of the
sovereign.
Foucault argues, however, that understanding the problem of domination only by
reference to sovereign power renders our understanding of contemporary issues ofjustice
inadequate, and he introduces two other forms that organized, institutional power may
take: discipline and governmentality. With the emergence of Enlightenment science and
new technologies concerning the human body, it became possible to regulate, control, and
exploit people in ever more refined and sophisticated ways. Foucault describes this as "the
development of power techniques oriented towards individuals and intended to rule them
in a continuous and permanent way." Michel Foucault, Politics and Reason, in POLITICS,
PHILOSOPHY, CurLTuRE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1977-1984, at 60 (1988).When
taken up by the state, this disciplinary power is described as "governmentality" As Alan
Hunt elaborates:
Most significantly governmentality comes to focus on the economic life and
well-being of "the nation," and the order, health, and prosperity (or lack of
it) of its citizens. The "national economy" and "the population" become the
key targets of calculated administration; one of its most important intellectual
manifestations is the invention of political economy.
HuNT, supra.
148. Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note 147, at 105.As Foucault explains:
[T]he theory of sovereignty; and the organisation of a legal code centred
upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the
mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures,
the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to
everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the exercise of his proper
sovereign rights. The juridical systems-and this applies both to their codifi-
cation and their theorisation-have enabled sovereignty to be democratised
through the constitution of a public right articulated upon collective sover-
eignty, while at the same time this democratisation of sovereignty was
fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary
coercion.
Id.
149. See Kirstie M. McClure, Taking Liberties in Foucault's Triangle: Sovereignty, Disci-
pline, Governnentality, and the Subject of Rights, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 149,
152 (Austin Sarat &Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
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to one form of power necessarily means the strengthening of the others. s°
She argues that these theorists use the language of rights but in ways that
do not necessarily reinforce the triangle; they offer critiques of discipli-
nary and governmental power that do not simply reinscribe sovereignty.''
Like Malthus, Owen, and Hazlitt, legal populists exhibit a thorough-
going skepticism about both discipline and governmentality. But the
sovereignty they yearn for in its stead is not only a "permanent instru-
ment of criticism of the monarchy" but also a critique of sovereign theory
as Foucault saw it-the theory that permitted "a system of right to be
superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to con-
ceal its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its
techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of
the state, the exercise of his sovereign rights. 1 12 Instead, as McClure sug-
gests, the legal populists attempt to be "'subjects of rights' that are 'before
the law' in a[n] ... equivocal sense-variously within and without the
discourse of sovereignty, at once indebted and excessive to the forms of
subjectivity and self-assertion made licit by legal guarantee."'' 1 3 In their
attempt to rewrite what it means to be a subject before the law-their
attempt to radically recenter the authority of law not only in the Word
but in the protestant body of the People that interprets it-their Sover-
eignty does not resemble Foucault's sovereignty at all. For the legal
populists have returned to the well of American revolutionary theory,
identifying true law with the will of the Sovereign People and seeking to
reconstitute that People as protection against the nightmare of bureau-
cratic domination represented for many by Social Security cards, drivers'
licenses, and above all the Internal Revenue Service, that ur-agency of
governmentality. 5 4 In the place of modern disciplinary power, they assert
their own power-typically based in protestant Christianity-to recreate
and regulate family and social relations and construct the self.'5
Toward the end of his book, Mitchell poignantly locates the way in
which contemporary consumer capitalism is able to bring even survival-
ism into its warm embrace. Mitchell visits a "Preparedness Expo" held at
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 153.
153. Id. at 187.
154. Alan Hunt has argued that Foucault wrongly "expels" law from disciplinary and
governmental power, identifying it narrowly with sovereign power. See Alan Hunt, Fou-
caults Expulsion of Law:Toward a Retrieval, in EXPLORATIONS IN LAw AND SocirY:TowARD A
CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW, supra note 147, at 272. Legal populism makes a similar
mistake.
155. Consider in this light, for instance, the link between legal populism and fathers'
rights, which also sometimes spills over into anti-Nineteenth Amendment polemics. See,
e.g., Fathers' Manifesto and Christian Party, The 19th Amendment & the Totalitarian State, at
http://christianparty.net/fedgov.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). The Christianity espoused
on this site is clearly of the Protestant fundamentalist, patriarchal kind.
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the Seattle Center, at which all manner of vendors are hawking various
preposterous wares with the same implied message: "Buy this, buy that.
Get rich. Go free. Stay young."' 116 Mitchell argues that this spectacle is the
beginning wedge of the incorporation of survivalism into its antithesis-
what he describes as "Planet Microsoft., 117 Planet Microsoft offers culture
as a commercialized, packaged experience, something you buy in order to
express your identity (Microsoft might say "lifestyle") in your leisure time
(when you are not submitting to the rigorous disciplines of global pro-
duction on behalf of the corporations that sell you the experience of
freedom). Survivalism, he argues, is in the most sympathetic account a
means of resistance to Planet Microsoft."' 8 It offers a world of impending,
near-apocalyptic "troubles" in which survival is hard in order for indi-
viduals to experience the exhilaration of making, not buying, their culture
from the ground up, creating everything from sources of potable water to
constitutional history.
With respect to legal populism, the problems are not only the recu-
perative powers of consumer capitalism, but also the forms of expertise
that Foucault identified as central to discipline and the state's ability to
count, classify, and ultimately exercise surveillance over its citizens in the
name of the public good. The flaws in legal populism are, accordingly, not
only its vulnerability to Planet Microsoft, but also its romantic assumption
that the mere assertion of Sovereignty can magically make one invulnerable
156. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 186.
157. Id.
158. Mitchell's prose is at its most passionate (and purple) when he defends survival-
ists against Planet Microsoft:
Modernity trades complexity and challenge for efficiency and abundance,
and most are satisfied enough with the exchange. Safe, synthetic, Expo-like
titillations suffice. But not for survivalists.Weber and Simmel foresaw an om-
nipresent order of repressive formalism against which social actors must resist
to retain their identities. But the metaphor of modernity's iron-caged exis-
tence is gone to rust. Modernity's most obvious manifestation is not tyrannic
restraint but Planet Microsoft. No resistance in sight. The store is open, the
TV on, all welcome. The shelves and channels are full of options. Pick this,
try that, they come in all sizes, all colors too, something for every budget,
every taste. Modernity gives us more: more things to own and consume,
more facts to analyze, more ways to communicate. But it also leaves us less:
aimless, rootless, formless, meaningless, groundless, useless. Among the vapor-
ous vagaries of Planet Microsoft neither anomie nor alienation prevail. Ennui
does. In this devitalized world survivalists search and struggle for resistance
not against it.
Survivalists don't want liberation from oppressive yokes or demystification of
grand confusions. They want a place between a rock and a hard spot. A place
of resistance. A firm, gritty antithesis against which to test their talents, meas-
ure their mettle, and gauge their gumption.
Id. at 200.
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to Foucault's triangle and its nostalgic assumption that once upon a time,
all Citizens really did have the same power as the King of England.
III. A PEDAGOGY OF THE MARGINALIZED
In the previous section, I developed an account of legal populism
that, in line with recent scholarship on conspiracy theory, sympathized
with its impulses of resistance toward various forms of domination in eve-
ryday American life. In this section, I develop a more skeptical account,
one that focuses on the legal populist not as Everyman but as occupying a
very particular niche in the American class and race hierarchy.
We may start again with Hofstadter, who argues that the paranoid
style of politics emerges when struggles over "status" as opposed to "inter-
ests" consume the public sphere. The paranoid style, he suggests, is
mobilized by "social conflicts that involve ultimate schemes of values and
that bring fundamental fears and hatreds, rather than negotiable interests,
into political action.'"' Hofstadter specifies the issues with which status
politics has traditionally been concerned:
First is the problem of American identity, as it is complicated
by our immigrant origins and the problems of ethnic minori-
ties; second, the problem of social status, defined as the capacity
of various groups and occupations to command personal def-
erence in society; and, finally, the effort of Americans of diverse
cultural and moral persuasions to win reassurance that their
values are respected by the community at large.
160
Hofstadter's view that interest politics represents the norm and status
politics the exception is, of course, subject to debate. His link between
status politics and the "paranoid style," however, has been reaffirmed by
many others. Peter Knight, for example, associates conspiracy theory with
an American nationalism that relies on narratives of ascriptive identity,
specifically narratives of White supremacy.1 6' The question of who is
genuinely American and who is not-a question that has played out in
the theater of race since D.W Griffiths' "Birth of a Nation"-lies at the
center of both Patriot ideology and the literature of disaster on which
survivalist fantasies thrive. Take, for example, one of the seminal texts in
the literature of disaster and survivalism: The Turner Diaries by Andrew
Macdonald (a pseudonym for William Pierce, leader of the neo-Nazi
159. HOFSTADTER, supra note 107, at 39.
160. Id. at 87.
161. CONSPiRAcY NATION, supra note 107, at 4 ("From the first encounters with the
land and the people of the New World, the conspiratorial imagination of sinister forces has
helped to constitute a sense of American national unity through a notion of racial iden-
tity.").
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National Alliance). The Turner Diaries describes the activities of a racist,
anti-Semitic underground movement called "The Order" which, through
a series of violent acts during the 1990s, gains power in the United States
and eventually the world.'62
Falling at the most overtly racist end of a spectrum of American dis-
aster fiction, 163 The Turner Diaries and its author have figured in a number
of real-life rebellions against the United States government in the name of
a new political-legal order. In the mid-1980s, for example, Robert J.
Mathews founded an Order of his own, composed of several men who
committed a string of robberies and bombings and finally murdered the
talk show host Alan Berg.' After informants passed information about
162. See ANDREW MACDONALD, THE TURNER DIARIEs: A NOVEL (1996). In the novel,
The Order's actions are prompted by the legal actions of ZOG, the Zionist Occupation
Government, under whose regime a series of catastrophic social events take place:
The "Cohen Act" leads to the confiscation of all private firearms. The Su-
preme Court rules anti-rape laws unconstitutional because they imply
differences between the sexes. This results in waves of rapes, particularly of
[W]hite women by [B]lack men. Banks are required to provide low-interest
loans to mixed-race couples buying property in [White neighborhoods.
Dystopian America decomposes into a "cesspool of mongrels and [Bilacks
and Jews and sick, twistedWhite Liberals."
Id. at 162-63, quoted in MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 142-43.
Then, the Order strikes back. Among the violent events necessary for the Order to
accomplish its cleansing of America are the bombing of FBI headquarters in Washington, a
mortar attack on the Capitol, the destruction of public utilities and communication sys-
tems, and the liberation of the nation after atomic bombs have been dropped on several
East Coast cities.
163. See MItE DAvis, ECOLOGY OF FEAR: Los ANcELEs AND Tnii IMAGINATION OF DIS-
ASTER 286-87 (1998). Davis, examining the destruction of Los Angeles in countless novels
and films since the late nineteenth century, argues that American disaster fiction originally
emerged as fantasies of racial anxiety:
Overwhelmingly a literature written for and consumed by the urban middle
classes, it depicted the nightmare side-chaos and violence as the necessary
expression of "survival of the fittest"-of the crude social Darwinism that
was the pitiless ethos of the age of the robber barons. In such stories, grow-
ing fears of violent social revolution and of the "rising tide of color"
accompanied increasing anxieties over the inevitability of future world wars
between the imperialist powers. New means of mass destruction-microbes,
radioactivity, poison gases, and flying machines-conquered the pulp press
years, sometimes decades, before they were added to the arsenals of the ma-
jor powers. At the same time, the purported discovery of "canals" on Mars by
several eminent astronomers gave plausibility to fears that the earth was
menaced by malevolent extraterrestrials. The result was a proliferation of
doom fiction that established virtually all the conventions of the genre still in
use today.
Id.
164. See NEIWERT, supra note 17, at 57-58.
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Mathews' activities and whereabouts to federal authorities, Mathews and
three companions were isolated on Whidbey Island, north of Seattle in
Puget Sound, and killed at the end of a thirty-six hour gun battle with
the FBI in December 1984. '65 According to Morris Dees, founder of the
Southern Poverty Law Center, William Pierce, author of the novel that
apparently inspired Mathews to action, said this about Mathews' revolu-
tionary career:
Bob gave us a very important symbol. He did what was mor-
ally right. He may have been a bit premature ... and he may
have made many tactical errors. But he reminded us we are not
engaged in a debat. between gentlemen.... Bob elevated ...
our struggle. He took us from name calling to blood-letting.
He cleared the air for all of us. In the long run that will be
helpful. 166
Mitchell notes that wreaths were laid at the gate where Mathews died.
Thus fantasies of apocalyptic violence occasionally erupt into reality.
Not only Mathews but also other members of self-styled Patriot groups
killed by the United States government have seen their deaths celebrated
as martyrdom. The shooting by the FBI of Randy Weaver and his family
in Ruby Ridge in 1992, and of David Koresh and his flock in Waco in
1993, for example, confirmed the importance of the cause to sympathetic
onlookers and made clear to them that even greater violence would be
necessary to destroy ZOG.
Two years to the day after the Waco assault-at 9:01 a.m. on April
19, 1995-a rental truck packed with fertilizer mixed with diesel fuel ex-
ploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.1 67 The blast killed 168 people, including nineteen children in
an on-site day care center. Until the destruction of the World Trade Cen-
ter twin towers on September 11, 2001, the "Oklahoma City Bombing"
was the deadliest terrorist attack in United States history. About an hour
and a half after the explosion, Timothy McVeigh was arrested for not hav-
ing a license tag and for being in possession of a weapon. 8 He was
wearing a t-shirt which had on its front a picture ofAbraham Lincoln and
165. Id. at 59.
166. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 145 (quoting MouRIs DEES wimH JAMES CoRCoRAN,
GATHERING STORM. AMERICA'S MILITIA THREAT 144-45 (1996)).
167. THE TREE OF LIBERTY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF PEBELLION AND POLITICAL
CRIME IN AMERICA; A LEGAL, HISTORICAL, SOCIAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO RE-
BELLIONS AND POLITICAL CRIMES, THEIR CAUSES, SUPPRESSION, AND PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 776 (Nicholas N. Kittrie & Eldon D.Wedlock,Jr., eds., rev. ed. 1998) [here-
inafter THE TREE or LIBERTY].
168. Complaint, United States v. McVeigh (WD. Okla. 1995) (No. M-95-98-H),
reprinted in THiIETEE OF LIBERTY, supra note 167, at 777.
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the words of Lincoln's assassin, John Wilkes Booth: "Sic Semper Tyrannis."'
16
1
On the back of the shirt was the famous quote from Thomas Jefferson:
"The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood
of tyrants"'"""
McVeigh, an Oklahoma military veteran, although not a member of
any organization, reportedly held a number of right-wing views and "was
particularly agitated about the conduct of the federal government in
Waco.... After visiting the site, McVeigh expressed extreme anger at the
federal government and advised that the Government should never had
done what it did.""' McVeigh was convicted on June 2, 1997, under fed-
eral law for the murder of eight federal employees who died in the
explosion."' The jury recommended that McVeigh receive the death pen-
alty.73 The Supreme Court upheld the murder convictions, and McVeigh
was executed on June 11, 2001, by lethal injection at the United States
federal prison in Terre Haute, Indiana.7 4 It was the first execution of a
convicted criminal by the federal government of the United States since
the execution ofVictor Feguer in Iowa on March 15, 1963."'5
The fertilizer-diesel fuel mixture used as the incendiary device in
the Oklahoma City bombing closely resembled a similar mixture de-
scribed in some detail in The Turner Diaries.7 Again, Pierce offered his
post-hoc commentary, although with more caution and fewer compli-
mentary words than he had offered about Mathews. Pierce acknowledged
that "someone may have read the book," which he termed a possible "in-
spiration," and predicted that there would be further acts like the attack,
but he opined that what happened in Oklahoma made little political
sense because it was not sustained."' "One day," Pierce insisted, "there will
be real, organized terrorism-aimed at bringing down the govern-
nient."'78
It is wrong, therefore, to read legal populism only as the voice of
Everyman struggling against the forces of contemporary domination. This
169. Tis TEE or LiBFasY, supra note 167, at 776.
170. Id.
171. Complaint, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
172. See Timothy McVeigh, Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy-
McVeigh (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
173. See Newshour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast,June 13, 1997), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/june97/mcveigh6-13.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2005).
174. See Timothy McVeigh, supra note 172.
175. Id.
176. See Howard Pankratz, Writer Predicts More Blasts; 'Turner Diaries' Author Denies
Okla. Bomb Link, DENVER POST, May 5, 1996, at A-29.
177. See The Niakor Project, Paranoia as Patriotism: Far-Right Influences on the Militia
Movenent: William L. Pierce and The Turner Diaries, at http://www.izkor.org/hweb/
orgs/anerican/adl/paranoia-as-patriotism/william-pierce.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
178. Id.
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voice of resistance adopts a very particular subject position:White, radical,
and Christian. 9 Both its radical tendencies and its openly avowed White-
ness apparently set it apart from the American political mainstream. In this
section, however, I will argue that the political attitudes of legal populism
are not as far from those of political elites as it might first appear. In its
anti-government energies, its claim to an originalist understanding of the
canonical legal texts and political traditions of the United States, and its
felt sense of betrayal and disenfranchisement, legal populism is allied
closely with many powerful voices, and in this way serves as a commen-
tary on the political mainstream rather than as its antithesis.
A. The Attack on Government
Legal populism's virulent hatred of the federal government, perhaps
the movement's most obviously radical feature, is nevertheless in sympathy
with political-legal agendasbeing pursued by right-wing elites. Economist
and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, for instance, has suggested
that the aim of the Bush II administration is to drive the federal govern-
ment as we know it out of existence, and with it all traces of the Great
Society welfare state.'90 With respect to law, Frank Valdes argues that for
many right-wing activists, all constitutional and administrative law since
the New Deal is suspect; the aim of what the right repeatedly refers to as
the "culture wars" is to accomplish "a kind of'cultural cleansing' that in
the course of events will leave the purified society looking and feeling
like the 1780s as much as politically and physically possible' l"
179. Although I do not explore the links between disaster motifs in fundamentalist
Christianity and in legal populism here, the link certainly exists. See Koniak, supra note 5,
at 65. It is interesting to note in this regard that another entry in the survivalist literature
has been penned by Christian Coalition founder Pat Robertson. In Robertson's novel,
THE END Or TUE AGE, "God himself decides to flush Los Angeles down the toilet with a
'giant meteor' and a mile-high tsunami." DAvis, supra note 163, at 286-87 (discussing PAT
ROBERTSON, TIE END OF THE AGE (1995)).The Christian interest in disaster stems from the
millenarian strain within fundamentalist Protestantism. See PAUL BOYER, WHEN TIME StALL
BE No MoRE: PROPHECY BELIEF IN MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE 259 (1995). The best-
selling LEFT BEHIND series of novels written by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, for ex-
ample, is inspired by the idea that the world will end in a cataclysm, after which Jesus will
return to earth. See, e.g., TiM F. LAHAYE & JERRY B. JENKiNS, LEFT BEHIND: A NOVEL OF THE
EARTH'S LAST DAYS (LEFT BEHIND No. 1) (1996).
180. PAUL KIUGmAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING: LOSING OUR WAY IN THE NEW CEN-
TURY 6 (2003).
181. See Francisco Valdes, Culture, "Kulturkampf" and Beyond: The Anti-discrimination
Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in ThE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND
SOCIETY 271, 284 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
The redemptive projects of both professional right-wing and legal populists fre-
quently focus on the New Deal, a key moment in the emergence of the modern
administrative state and a moment that liberals celebrate and conservatives mourn. Cass
Sunstein, for example, praises "the Revolution of 1937" (1937 being the year in which the
[VOL. 10:269
Vultures in Eagles' Clothing
Similarly, the legal populists' love for the common law can be seen as
in solidarity with the right-wing elite's jurisprudential efforts to revive the
private law jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. Critical legal scholar
Jay Feinman argues that property, contract, and tort law are undergoing a
quiet "classical revival:' in which the central jurisprudential developments
of the twentieth century are being rolled back.18 2 Jay Feinman describes
the nineteenth-century vision that is being revived thus:
The substantive vision of classical legal thought is a world of
independent individuals, each of whom acts within a broad
sphere of legal autonomy to pursue his own self-interest. The
role of government is precisely defined and narrowly circum-
scribed. The legislature has limited authority to regulate
narrowly and traditionally defined harmful activities. The
Supreme Court decided West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, upholding a statute providing a mini-
mum wage for women workers) that, in his view, marked the judicial "vindication" of the
New Deal. See CAss R. SusT~ia, THF. PARTIAL CONSTITTION 51 (1993).
Sunstein's colleague at the University of Chicago Law School, Richard Epstein,
vigorously disagrees. According to Epstein, nearly all of the modern administrative state
and its jurisprudence, including environmental regulation and anti-discrimination law, is
unconstitutional because it involves "takings" of private property without compensation
and infringes on personal liberty. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
Michael Sandel locates in the New Deal, and particularly in the advent of Keynes-
ian fiscal policy, the seeds of the liberal "procedural republic":
[Keynesian economics] displayed two features of the liberalism that defines
the procedural republic, First, it offered policymakers and elected officials a
way to "bracket," or set aside, controversial conceptions of the good life, and
so promised a consensus that programs for structural reform could not offer.
Second, by abandoning the ambition of inculcating certain habits and dispo-
sitions, it denied government a stake in the moral character of its citizens and
affirmed the notion of persons as free and independent selves, capable of
choice.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRAcy's DiSCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSO-
PmnY 262 (1996). This move to liberalism is precisely what legal populists, along with social
conservatives, mourn. According to Eugene Schroder, a Patriot:
In 1933, President Roosevelt took office and proclaimed that a state of
emergency existed in the nation, the Great Depression.... Roosevelt, backed
by a subservient Congress, proceeded to suspend the Constitution to deal
with this so-called emergency, a patently unlawful act. The unlawfully de-
clared state of emergency has never been rescinded. ... The federal
government has thus been operating unlawfully, i.e., outside the shackles of
the Constitution, since 1933.
See Koniak, supra note 5, at 79 (citing EUGENE SCHRODER WITH MICK NELLIS, CONSTITU-
TION: FACT OR FICTION (1995)).
182. Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1 (2004).
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courts, applying a complete, coherent, and formal body of law,
police the boundaries of legislative authority and define the
ground rules for interaction among private individuals, namely,
the rules of contract, tort, and property. 1
3
Like Valdes, Feinman argues that the classical revival is driven by right-
wing ideology.' For Feinman, however, the transformation of private law
is driven by a vision of laissez-faire capitalism:
The master narrative of the vision of market centrality is
Reaganesque: Once upon a time there was a golden age when
a man (always a man) could stand on his own two feet, his
rights inviolate. Individual liberty, personal responsibility, and
economic opportunity were the foundations of American life.
Society was organized and controlled by two institutions: the
market and the state. The market was primary; through it, peo-
ple could maximize their potential, realize their dreams, and
rise or fall on their own merits. The state was subordinate; be-
yond its minimal functions of guaranteeing physical security,
providing public goods, and protecting individual rights, gov-
ernment offered only the possibility of unwise and pernicious
interference in the social order created by the market.' 5
B. The Return of Formalism
The vision of a dramatically shrunken public sphere and a corre-
spondingly robust private sphere is not the only thing legal populists and
right-wing elites share. In their commitment to originalist readings of
canonical American legal texts, the legal populists are also not as marginal
as they might initially seem. As Thomas Grey observes, a "new formalism"
has recently emerged among legal scholars and jurists, related to the cur-
rent ascendance of right-wing elites. Grey defines the new formalism as
consisting of four tendencies: "a preference for rules over standards, textu-
alism (emphasis on plain meaning in legal interpretation), originalism
(emphasis on original understanding), and conceptualism (emphasis on
the importance of principle and coherence in doctrine and adjudica-
tion).' ' 6
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 56 ("The unmaking of the common law is consistent with the contempo-
rary campaign by political conservatives and business interests to reshape American
government, law, and society.").
185. Id. at 56-57.
186. SUNSTEIN, supra note 181, at 51;Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 2 (Apr.
2002) (unpublished manuscript presented at Boalt Hall Legal and Political Theory
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The most famous proponent of the new formalism is Justice An-
tonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court.'87 Scalia's written
decisions, speeches, and essays are characterized by a willingness to over-
turn long-settled precedent on the basis of historical evidence about the
original or "plain meaning" of texts. Scalia's textual originalism is taken to
its limit by legal populists, for whom most of the official law since the
original Constitution is illegitimate. Though they differ greatly in degree,
the formalist textual method and the legal populist textual method share
what Mitchell and Levin, drawing on the work of Sanford Levinson, de-
scribe as a "protestant" approach to interpretation:
(T]he "protestant" tradition, states that the "source of [the] doc-
trine ... is the constitutional text alone." The authoritative
interpretation is "based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at
least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation." The second
position, labeled the "catholic" tradition, holds that constitu-
tional interpretation should be based on "the Constitution plus
unwritten tradition." Under the "catholic" position, "the
Supreme Court is the dispenser of ultimate interpretation."
Common-law court theory insists on the authority of individual
interpretation of the constitutional text, but is distinctive in how
it approaches the authority of the original text and the use of
supplementary texts. While common-law theorists draw upon a
number of other documents beyond the Constitution, including
the Magna Carta, Articles of Confederation, Federalist Papers,
Northwest Ordinance, Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions,
Workshop, on file with author). Cass Sunstein calls the formalists "legal authoritarians" and
describes their jurisprudential temper in this way:
[Legal authoritarianism] sees laws, constitutional or otherwise, as deals among
self-interested actors. It is usually skeptical of all efforts to reason about social
and economic problems. It disparages such efforts as a mere mask for self-
interest or as incapable of resolving social and political disputes, which it
treats as based on premises too fixed and incomnmensurable to be a subject of
deliberation.... Resolution is possible only by warfare or compromise
among self-interested bargainers....
Disagreements about ethical and political problems are not an occasion for
shared reasoning but instead proof of its impossibility. "Value judgments," un-
derstood as prejudices, are the consequence. If we depart from the enterprise
of tracing legal outcomes directly to a legitimating decision, usually an exer-
cise of force, we will fall into the chaos of evaluation, something on which
there are deep cleavages in society.... No judge can claim the ability or the
warrant to say anything about those cleavages.
SUNSmEIN, supra note 181, at 51.
187. Grey notes that although Robert Bork calls himself an originalist and a textual-
ist but not a formalist, he can be placed in this company as well. Grey, supra note 186, at 2;
see also ROBERT H. BORK, TiiE TEMPTING or AMERICA (1990).
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English common law and Black's Law Dictionary, they deliber-
ately disregard a large part of the American constitutional and
legal tradition, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, court
rulings from 1937 to the present, and congressional legislation
from 1933 to the present. Common-law theory is thus a
modified, but relatively pure form of "protestant" interpreta-
tion, in which theorists use those texts which pass into their
canon in a literalist fashion, and discard all texts which do not
meet their ideological standards as either nonexistent or as evi-
dence of the illegitimacy of the government of that time.'
C. Marginalization and Melancholia
Finally, legal populism's rhetoric of political disenfranchisement, dis-
possession, and resentment can also be understood as a property held in
common with the new right and with neoconservatism. As Valdes argues,
contemporary right-wing elites see themselves engaged in a Kulturkampf
which crystallized in the 1980s in the "culture wars" concerning the
teaching of the humanities canon in American universities and has since
focused on the protection of so-called "family values. 189 Both the culture
wars and family values campaigns, like the "angry White male" anti-
affirmative action backlash of the 1980s, have been characterized by the
conviction that "traditional" (read "White") Americans are today hemmed
in and threatened by politicized identity politics to the extent that they,
not traditionally subordinated groups, have become the truly dispossessed.
This sense of disenfranchisement is vividly echoed in the literature of le-
gal populism.
By no objective political or economic measure can those who speak
in the voice of the "angry White male" or (in the shorthand of the No-
vember 2004 presidential election) "the red states" be described as
dispossessed or subordinated. Yet rhetorically speaking, the "transparent
White American" has certainly been unsettled-forced to publicly justify
himself by insurgent identity groups who have successfully made White-
ness visible and questioned the unthinking identification of White
supremacy and the American nation. This transformation is indeed sym-
bolically threatening-even if the material distribution of power and
wealth has not changed. The free-floating anxiety represented by the con-
spiracy narratives of legal populism seem to draw at times on the energies
of political resentment that similarly fuel the current attack on same-sex
marriage and fueled earlier attacks on affirmative action and feminism. In
this context, legal populism's stories of the theft of law and the possibility
of escape from the governmental grid, the founding of new American
188. MITCHELL, supra note 4.
189. SeeValdes, supra note 181, at 284.
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republics, and the claiming of Sovereign Citizenship are creative and ro-
mantic metaphors to express a sense of betrayal and disenfranchisement,
emotions that in turn represent a real (though not material) political
loss.1 90
From this perspective, even legal populism's peculiar appeals to Sov-
ereign Citizenship are more mainstream than they might first appear. The
un-self-conscious pro-Whiteness in these narratives, though jarring in
contemporary political discourse, was once unproblematic. In his famous
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan wrote:
The [W]hite race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast
to the principles of constitutional liberty.'
It is the loss of this heritage and this liberty that legal populism longs for,
in the name of a Sovereign Citizenry that contemporary governance has
betrayed. As David Williams observes:
The overt racists ... have adopted an incisive strategy for con-
stituting a people in late twentieth-century America: the
militia writers solve the problem of diversity among the citi-
zens by defining the citizenry to include only those like them.
That strategy has a certain historical resonance: eighteenth
century civic republicanism could posit the existence of a
common good because it restrictively defined the citizenry.
And if it were normatively defensible, that strategy might still
work; [W]hite conservative Christians, even today, might have
enough commonality to constitute a people and to possess a
common good.' 92
Indeed, some observers argue that White, conservative Christians in the
Bush II Administration are preparing for just such a victory of homoge-
neity, represented by the "Rapture" they believe to be imminent. 93
Despite the many affinities between legal populism and some right-
wing elite agendas, however, legal populism ultimately puts its faith in
self-help rather than representative government. This suggests to me a
fundamental difference between the two movements: the constituency to
which legal populism speaks is not a constituency which fears the loss of
its privileges; it is a constituency which has never experienced those
190. See BENNETY M. BERGER, AN ESSAY ON CULTURE: SYMBOLIC STRUCTURE AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 34-35 (1995).
191. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
192. Williams, The Militia Movement, supra note 8, at 930.
193. Bill Moyers, Welcome to Doomsday, 52 N.Y. Ra. BOOKs 5 (Mar. 24, 2005).
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privileges except by way of nostalgia. Even its open appeal to Whiteness
comes less from anti-Black animus than from an un-self-conscious nostal-
gia for a pre-Reconstruction world: a nation of citizens that would hold
property in land and in a common heritage such that they would have no
need for "equality," only liberty.
Howard Winant's taxonomy of racial projects in contemporary
American politics distinguishes five such projects: "far right, new right,
neoconservative, neoliberal, and new abolitionist.'"19'4 Within the far right,
Winant identifies two ideological strands, which he names "fascist" and
"neofascist":
On the far right the cornerstone of [W]hite identity is belief
in an ineluctable, unalterable, racialized difference between
[W]hites and non[W]hites....
Explicitly fascist groups on the far right openly admire Nazi
race-thinking, fantasize about racial genocide, and dream of es-
tablishing an all-[W]hite North American nation, or, failing
that, seceding from the United States to establish such a nation,
possibly in the Northwest.... [Winant places Pierce and
Christian Identity in this category.]
"Neofascism's" response has been political mobilization on ra-
cial grounds: if [B]lacks have their organizations and
movements, why shouldn't [W]hites? The various activities of
David Duke exemplify the new trend: his electoral campaigns,
his attempts at student organization (for example his effort to
create [W]hite student unions on college campuses), and his
emblematic National Association for the Advancement of
[W]hite People. 19'
194. Howard Winant, Behind Blue Eyes: Whiteness and Contemporary US. Racial Politics,
in OF WHITE: READINGS ON RACE, POWER, AND SOCIETY 40, 43 (Michelle Fine et al. eds.,
1997).
195. Id. at 43.James Corcoran describes some of this political activity ffirther:
In March of 1986, two Lyndon LaRouche supporters [noted White su-
premacists] won in the Democratic primary race in Illinois. The victories
forced Democratic gubernatorial candidate Adlai E. Stevenson III to form
the Solidarity party and run candidates against the LaRouche supporters in
the general election....
Then, in February of 1989, David Duke, former Imperial Wizard of the
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, ran as a Republican and won a seat in the
Louisiana state senate. Duke claimed that he was no longer a [Wlhite su-
premacist. Instead, said Duke, he was a [Wihite civil rights activist.
David Duke, in CONTEMPORARY VOICES OF WHITE NATIONAuSM IN AMERICA 166, 167 (Carol
M. Swain & Russ Nieli eds., 2003) (relating an interview with Duke during which he
[VOL. 10:269
Vultures in Eagles' Clothing
Winant distinguishes both these elements of the far right from what he
terms the "new right:' which was born with the Republican "Southern
Strategy" and its successful capture of White backlash against the Civil
Rights Movement, and which prefers not to openly claim a White iden-
tity.
196
If explicit references to White pride distinguish the far right from
the new right, then legal populist narratives like that of Sovereign Citi-
zenship would seem to constitute a far right racial project. But, in contrast
with the anti-Black resentment mobilized by the Duke campaign, Sover-
eign Citizenship seems preoccupied with Whiteness. The drama of
equality versus inequality-central to both the rhetoric of the "new social
movements" of the 1960s-1970s and Winant's neofascism-is supplanted
entirely in legal populism by the rhetoric of liberty versus slavery: a rheto-
ric in which Whites, not people of color, occupy the position of the slaves
longing for freedom. From this perspective, the language of Sovereign
Citizenship is an analogue of the nineteenth-century language of "wage
slavery." Historian David Roediger argues that when nineteenth-century
White factory workers described their own conditions as slavery, they
took up a rhetorical stance that allied them with Black slaves yet erased
the crucial differences between wage labor and slave labor, substituting
their own struggle for the abolitionist struggle.9 7 The rhetoric of Sover-
eign Citizenship similarly substitutes a narrative ofWhite marginalization
for non-White subordination.
It is important, I think, to distinguish this nostalgic racism from the
rhetoric of victimhood and Nietzschean ressentiment that political theorists
Wendy Brown and William Connolly identify as characteristic of modern
described his organization, the National Organization for European-American Rights
("NOFEAR"), as a "civil rights group").
196. Howard Winant writes:
Like the far right, the new right seeks to present itself as the tribune of dis-
enfranchised [W]hites. But the new right is distinguished-if not always
sharply-from the far right by several factors. First, rather than espouse ra-
cism and [W]hite supremacy, it prefers to present these themes subtexually:
the familiar "code-word" phenomenon.
Winant, supra note 194, at 44. Winant's reference to the "code word" phenomenon
touches on the fact that in contemporary times, White resentment against people of color
is often muted, expressed through code issues like welfare, crime, and affirmative action.
For an exploration of the Republican "Southern Strategy" from this perspective, see, for
example, THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE,
RIGHTS, AND TAxEs ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991).
197. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF
T-E AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 55-60 (1991) (exploring the use of slavery rhetoric by
White wage laborers, in which they both identified with and came to displace slaves
themselves, eventually experiencing their identities as precisely not-Black).
SPRING 2005]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
American politics.' 9' Some right-wing racial projects, such as David
Duke's Association for the Advancement ofWhite People and the heavily
racialized backlashes against affirmative action and "welfare as we know
it," do carry with them an emotional valence of seething resentment, and
some Whites do seem obsessed with alternately mimicking and denounc-
ing the racist demagogues they believe to be leading the identity
movements of subordinated people.' But the main body of legal populist
literature saves its hatred for the government, not misbegotten Fourteenth
Amendment citizens. Whereas the far right, new right, and neoconserva-
tives obsess about the wrongful development of "special rights" for others,
the legal populists concentrate on their own, very personal loss of citizen-
ship, a citizenship that they, in fact, have never experienced. Their racism is
aversive, pro-White, rather than anti-Black. 00
Legal populism is a practice of those who are marginalized but not
subordinated. It is primarily composed by and for people who are symboli-
cally on the side of power yet outside the political and economic elite, a
population that feels cheated out of a birthright it believes it has been
promised.)0 ' It thus stages a direct claim to the loyalty of the American
198. See WrENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 60-61 (1995) (distinguishing Whiteness as a "reactive" identity as opposed to
"middle-class" identity, which she views as the ground for subordinated claims of injury and
identity). In a similar vein, political theorist William Connolly posits that a free-floating
resentment that is easily turned against the disenfranchised characterizes contemporary
politics. CONNOLLY, supra note 128, at 23.
199. For good examples of this kind of rhetoric, see the interviews in CONTEMPO-
RARY VOICES OF WHITE NATIONALISM IN AMERICA, supra note 195.
200. See SAMUEL L. GAERTNER ET AL., Does Mhite Racism Necessarily Mean Antiblack-
ness? Aversive Racism and Prowhiteness, in OFF WHITE: READINGS ON RACE, POWER, AND
SOCIETY, supra note 194, at 167.
201. Roxanne A. Dunbar speaks eloquently of this group:
Poor, rural [W]hites (the original [W]hite trash) have lived by dreams, at least
the ones I come from did and, in a perverse way, still do, albeit reacting to
"broken dreams." (Someone or some force has hijacked their country and
now controls the government-Jews through the supposed "Zionist Occu-
pation Government," the Federal Reserve, Communists, Liberals, the United
Nations, Gays and Feminists, Satan, etc.) Certainly it can be argued that all
the immigrants from all over the world who have been drawn by the
"American dream" from then to now believed and continue to believe in
"it"-the American dream. But there is a distinct difference between the
post industrial revolution, mostly urban immigrants who created the concept
of"a nation of immigrants," and the original rural frontier settlers. The latter
were landless or land-poor peasants given "free" (stolen) land on the edge of
the colonies (later the states of the U.S. Republic). The price they had to pay
for land and potential wealth was blood-to drive out the indigenous farm-
ers, the Indians.They lived in terror, isolated, surrounded....
Those who didn't make it, and even some of those who did, moved on, shed
blood opening new lands, usually lost again, and moved on again. Foot sol-
diers of empire I call them/us. They unleashed rivers of blood, torrents of
blood, unimaginable violence, murder, slaughter, which we refuse to ac-
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nation that cannot be made by non-White identities except through indi-
rect, tortuous claims for "equality.
20 2
Whereas right-wing elites have political and economic power, and
some "red state" voters have religious faith, legal populists have only their
own fantasies of agency to fall back on. Conspiracy theorizing, the apoca-
lyptic imagination, and legal populism compose, I think, a kind of
pedagogy for the marginalized: those who are symbolically on the side of
power yet materially disenfranchised, a population that has historically
received "the wages of Whiteness" and continues to seek what it believes
it has been promised even as that dream slides further into obscurity.
CONCLUSION
In 1996, when I first read the report in the San Francisco Chronicle
about California state senator Donald Rogers and his attempt to claim his
"[W]hite man's citizenship," my shock was, in part, one of recognition. To
his dying day, my paternal grandfather, a committed "race man," believed
that the American moon landing was a hoax perpetuated in order to cow
the Black man into submission. I was also familiar, from my own friends
and family, with the various conspiracy theories that run through African
American communities. 20 3 As a critical race theorist, I was used to under-
standing these theories as a form of populist resistance to racial
knowledge and confront but which cannot be dislodged from our collective
memory- In the process of that struggle the trekker, the frontier settler, imag-
ined himself and his progeny transformed into the native Americans, the true
Americans. Blood-right, it could be called.
Roxanne A. Dunbar, Bloody Footprints: Reflections on Growing up Poor White, in WHITE
TRASH: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICA 75-76 (Matt Wray & Annalee Newitz eds., 1997).
202. See, e.g., The Nation of Moorish Americans: A Social Service Agency to Reclaim Your
Nationality, at http://wvw.tnoma.org/bey.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).The legal popu
list projects I have run into that are self-consciously non-White in their subject position
do not take the original United States Constitution as their starting point, but rather begin
with international human rights language and the international norm of sovereignty for
peoples. The website of Minister Louis Bey, for example, founder of The Nation of Moor-
ish Americans, declares:
The Nation of Moorish-Americans calls all free Negroes of the African race
to reclaim their nationality. Free Negroes of the African race are not techni-
cally "citizens" within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.
Since 1776, Negroes of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to
this country and sold as slaves, have been existing in America without their
legitimate identity. Brought to America as slaves and as property to be
bought and sold, the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court have
never changed that definition of the Negro.
Id.
203. See generally PATRICIA A. TURNER, I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEvINE: RUMOR
IN AFRICAN AMERICAN CULTURE (1993).
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domination. How unsettling, then, to run across a wellspring of conspir-
acy theorizing colored White, taking the heart of American political
culture as its starting point.
What links the marginalized but not subordinated with the marginal-
ized and subordinated with whom critical race scholars are traditionally
concerned is the work that Norman Spaulding calls "the Constitution as
countermonument."21 As Spaulding writes, "The Reconstruction Amend-
ments . .. mark injustices that cannot be disowned, injustices opaquely but
deliberately inscribed in the founding instrument itself, injustices that are
unavoidably American-inseverable from the national body.' 25 Spaulding is
concerned with how, in contemporary times, we can keep alive the anti-
racist tradition memorialized in the Reconstruction Amendments, as against
a contemporary jurisprudence of federalism that seems to have contracted
amnesia with respect to this history of struggle. The legal populists are
engaged in a similar struggle to keep visible the rupture in the constitu-
tional text: the rupture not only between the old and new Constitutions,
but also between Whiteness and Americanness.
What keeps these two projects of counter-memory apart is their
political valence-progressive versus reactionary-as well as their con-
stituencies-subordinated versus marginalized. The anti-racists look
forward in time to an imagined multicultural future; the populists look
backward to an imagined monocultural past. The anti-racists are politi-
cally, economically, and culturally stigmatized by their identification with
traditionally despised groups; the populists are not. But politics and race
are entwined for legal populism as for critical race theory. Whiteness and
Americanness-and their complex entwinement-are simultaneously the
marks of legal populism's marginalization and its centrality to American
political culture, and the marks of critical race theory's disenfranchisement
and its centrality to that same culture. Critical race theory and legal popu-
lism agree, then, if for very different reasons, on the legal and political
significance of race. And although the marginalized and the subordinated's
visions of America are incompatible, the marginalized and the subordi-
nated share a commitment to the Constitution as counter-memory that
the liberal center has often worked to avoid. If anything links my grandfa-
ther to Senator Rogers, it is their mutual recognition that the past is never
really past, and that the past contains other Americas waiting to be born.
204. Norman Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstnction,
and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003).
205. Id. at 2000.
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